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ABSTRACT 
JOHN DEWEY: A FEMINIST CONSIDERATION OF HIS CONCEPTS OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIALITY 
MAY 1992 
ANA M. MARTINEZ ALEMAN, B.A., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW 
YORK AT BINGHAMTON 
M.A., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON 
Ed.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Johnstone Campbell 
This dissertation considers selected aspects of John Dewey's 
educational philosophy from a feminist perspective. As inquiry, it is a 
critical consideration of an established educational tradition. Most 
importantly, this inquiry suggests that through consideration, we may 
find relevant wisdom for our feminist educational theories and 
practices. The focus of this dissertation are John Dewey's concepts of 
the individual and sociality. Because both John Dewey's and feminist 
educational treatises are experience-centered, the consideration of 
the notions of the individual and of sociality is prudent. Through an 
examination of Dewey's construction of the individual and sociality, we 
are able to consider whether or not we can we apply Dewey's 
revisionist philosophy to our personal, political and social worlds. Do 
Dewey's concepts of the individual and the social have the 
characteristic connectedness that many feminists require? Do his 
conceptualizations of the individual and the social have anything of 
value for feminist agendas? Are feminist goals for the individual and 
sociality possible through a Deweyan conceptualization? Can Dewey’s 
v 
individual and sociality help fuel the feminist revolution? Concluding 
observations present the dangers of neglecting to consider past 
educational thought, feminist educational theorists' responsibilities, 
and the worth of reappropriating Dewey’s concepts of the individual 
and sociality. By reappropriating John Dewey's concepts of the 
individual and sociality and using them as feminist pedagogical 
anchors, we are able to take possession of the cognitive powers of 
interdependence. From the consideration of feminist models of 
sociality, we can submit that a feminist model of friendship can serve 
as the means for attaining broader and more heightened intellectual 
abilities. The writings of John Dewey serve as primary sources while 
texts on feminist theory provide the parameters for analysis. 
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Mujeres, a no dejar que el peligro del viaje y la inmensidad del 
territorio nos asuste - a mirar hacia adelante y a abrir paso en el monte 
[Women, lets not the danger of the journey and the vastness of the 
territory scare us - lets look forward and open paths in these woods). 
(Moraga & Anzaldua, p. v, 1983) 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: A TIMELY CONSIDERATION 
Good thinking, noted John Dewey, begins with consideration. It 
is through consideration, and the process of inquiry that follows, that 
we gain meaning. (Dewey, 1985, p. 8) When we engage in 
consideration, when inquiry involves us in a dialectical relationship 
between ourselves and the subject of our interest, we find new 
connections and possibilities. A consideration, an inquiry, viewed in 
this way, is "not a battle, it is communication" (Heldke, 1989, p. 113). 
The following pages ask you to consider John Dewey's 
educational philosophy from a different perspective, or more 
precisely, to consider Deweyan thought through a composite feminist 
lens. Since feminist thinking encompasses many perspectives, the 
view through each lens individually varies to degrees. 
For this inquiry to consider each feminist perspective 
individually and separately is unnecessary. This particular inquiry 
begins by acknowledging the existence of "species under (feminism's] 
genus" (Tong, 1989, p.l) and moves forward by suggesting that all 
feminisms together can engage in a useful consideration of John 
Dewey's philosophy. To suggest that there is only one feminist 
perspective, one all-inclusive way in which all feminists everywhere 
view the world, would be problematic for an inquiry which relies on 
dialectic and theoretical flexibility. So to facilitate this inquiry, a 
composite feminist lens, one which combines the typical and essential 
characteristics of feminisms, is used as a metaphorical tool. Much like 
Lugones and Spelman's demand for a "medley of women's voices" to be 
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heard in feminist theory (1983, p. 21), this lens provides us with a 
pliable view, a way in which feminisms can engage in the inquiry. 
Engaging in this process of consideration requires that we begin 
with the understanding that all forms of feminism are indeed 
participating. Feminism in its many forms can enter this particular 
investigation because we seek to discover the useful, and not to 
become overly involved in a critical analysis of philosophical 
antagonisms. There will be times, for example, when the essentialist 
feminist position will be at odds with the focus of a particular 
consideration. Nonetheless, such a position is still involved in, and 
relevant to, this inquiry. 
Though the "overarching feminist impulse" in academic 
scholarship is to reveal masculine bias (Dubois, et al., 1987, p. 16), this 
consideration will not have this as its particular focus, nor will we be 
too concerned with proving that Dewey was or was not a feminist. 
This particular inquiry asks that we engage in a critical consideration 
of an established tradition and take from it that which is most useful, 
practical and constructive for our feminist aims. Dewey's writing is 
itself a "vast territory." What we hope to find are some ideas, concepts 
and visions which can enrich our own feminist theories and practices. 
To engage in consideration is a good thing for anyone but, I 
assert, it is especially fitting for feminists. It is a feminist concern 
that traditionally women have not been able to consider or been given 
the opportunity to ponder the possibilities, to choose what is of value 
to us. Consideration implies choice; it is an opportunity to view, 
observe, question, interpret, ponder, judge and decide. For feminists, 
I believe that consideration is a political act. It is a demand for choice. 
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for the power of decision-making. It is a position of strength, 
independence, confidence, maturity; the empowerment derived from 
a purposeful act. There is nothing inherently weak, intellectually or 
otherwise, in consideration. It is not an absence of integrity, nor of 
decided posture. It is a bold and confident voice saying, "Wait! Let me 
decide if this or that is good for me. Let me choose my path." 
As with all acts, a feminist consideration has consequences but 
this is a reality which is not feared. A feminist engaged in 
consideration is not faint-hearted. Caution, not an unwillingness to 
take a risk, characterize the act. When we consider patriarchal 
philosophies and traditions it is because we are opportunistic. 
Discerning something useful, we appropriate without fear of 
compromise. We acknowledge the problematic where it exists but 
reappropriate what will open paths and secure our aims. 
A feminist consideration will engage its participants in "an 
endless dialectical interplay between the observer who is being 
observed; and the other, who, in being observed, is also observing his 
observer" (Barrett, 1979, p. 184). In a sense, the observers, in this 
case, we as feminist educational theorists, will find ourselves involved 
in a conversation with Dewey. Each conversant will undoubtedly be 
changed by this dialogue. Through our consideration, we will present 
our understanding of Dewey and in the process, at times suggest 
another interpretation. But of greater importance, is the fact that we 
may find relevant wisdom for our theories and practices in Deweyan 
thought. 
This consideration of John Dewey's thought has several 
objectives in mind. First and foremost, we should not lose sight of the 
4 
fact that we aim to take what is valuable from Dewey’s philosophy and 
not dwell too extensively on what is problematic. Criticism of the 
problematic is certainly valuable but in this inquiry, I suggest that it 
may be a limiting exercise. What we discover to be of value to our 
feminist agendas will serve to enrich and strengthen the movement, 
thus to weigh down our investigation too heavily with criticism, 
thwarts and frustrates the process of consideration and the possibility 
of reappropriation. Instead, the feminist dialectic we use enables us to 
creatively observe Dewey as well as ourselves. 
This is not to say, however, that we will brush aside or pretend 
not to see the problematic. On the contrary, we must acknowledge, 
for example, the fact that John Dewey wrote little directly addressing 
the education of girls and women and, as a rule, Dewey's 
commentaries neglected women's experiences. This is clearly an 
issue given the fact that feminist analyses of social issues are women- 
centered. Though Dewey wrote about birth control, suffrage and co¬ 
education, it can't be said that the central theses in these works 
concerned themselves specifically with the quality of girls' and 
women's experiences. The absence of direct attention paid to gender 
in Dewey's works is suspect, to be sure. 
Dewey's attempts to address gender and girls' and women's 
experience were either critical responses to the political climate 
("Symposium on Women's Suffrage"), or to social conditions 
("Education and Birth Control"), or to educational policy ("Is Co¬ 
education Injurious to Girls"). In each of these articles, Dewey, like 
many philosophers before and after him, examined a particular issue 
but kept gender as a secondary, if not absent concern. Women and 
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girls, or more specifically, their experiences as women and as girls, 
are discussed as objects to the subjects of politics, social policy and 
education. Gender issues like birth control and voting rights are 
discussed in the context of their impact on the greater human 
condition and not as "gender" issues. Though he does recognize that 
women's experiences differ from men's (Dewey, 1929, p. 846), John 
Dewey's writings were never explicitly dedicated to an intellectual 
examination of the female experiential world. 
Dewey's failure to place women at the center of his philosophical 
focus throughout his long life and many writings should be admitted 
but should not, I insist, foil attempts at consideration. If we were to 
suggest that only women-centered philosophies were those worthy of 
intellectual examination and consideration, it would appear that we 
would find little to consider. But more importantly, such a position, 
dismisses the possibility that we can gain insight from thinking which 
is outside of our own particular philosophical frameworks. For a 
feminist to consider John Dewey's educational philosophy is, to 
paraphrase Audre Lorde, not an attempt to re-build the master’s 
house. Instead, it is a strategy to reappropriate his tools and build a 
house of our own (Lorde, 1984). 
But because this is a feminist consideration, we must take into 
account those concerns directly relevant to feminist agendas. 
Concerns about the nature of humans, about the nature of knowledge 
and reason, and about the objectives of social life and the life of the 
individual are at the core of feminist agendas and must therefore be 
part of our investigation. However, given the scope and depth of each 
of these concerns, and John Dewey's seemingly endless list of 
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publications, it will certainly be impossible to engage in an exhaustive 
examination of each of these themes in this particular essay. Instead, 
our consideration focuses on the concepts of the individual and social 
life. 
I choose to focus our consideration on the notions of the 
individual and sociality because both John Dewey and feminist theory 
securely anchor their experience-centered educational philosophies to 
the educative potency of our interactions with the organic world. We 
conduct our lives as individuals within a social environment. As 
individuals, we act in a social context. For both Dewey and feminist 
educators, interactions between individuals and their environments 
lead to the kinds of experiences which form knowledge. 
Chapter 2 begins this consideration in earnest by examining 
how Dewey constructs the individual and sociality. Can we apply 
Dewey's revisionist philosophy to our personal, political and social 
worlds? Do Dewey's concepts of the individual and the social have the 
characteristic connectedness that many feminists require? Do his 
conceptualizations of the individual and the social have anything of 
value for feminist agendas? Are feminist goals for the individual and 
sociality possible through a Deweyan conceptualization? bell hooks 
writes that "to change and transform [our concepts of) self and society 
will determine the fate of the feminist revolution" (1991, p. 108). Can 
Dewey's individual and sociality help fuel the feminist revolution? 
As we observe Dewey throughout this inquiry, as we consider his 
ideas on the individual and society, we should seek not to reach a 
compromise position where Dewey and feminisms can coexist, nor 
should we simply react against his thinking. Both these postures. 
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compromise and reaction, suggest that one position can control the 
other. This is not the aim of consideration. Through consideration, 
we examine, give attention to, notice and reflect on what we observe. 
Such a process, such an endeavor, keeps feminist thinking dynamic, 
fresh, evolving, and rich with possibilities for growth. 
I begin this consideration by saying that there is no reason to 
fear such a journey, because such a critical inquiry can only serve to 
better our theories and practices. It is important to acknowledge in 
other philosophical traditions what is valuable, but it is all the more 
important and good to consider and take possession of, to 
reappropriate, all that enhances, strengthens, and deepens our own 
particular theory. As John Dewey, himself, warned: 
For in spite of itself, any movement that thinks and acts in terms 
of an 'ism becomes so involved in reaction against other 'isms 
that it is unwittingly controlled by them. (1938, p. 6) 
This is the foundation of this paper's thesis as well as its perspective. 
This inquiry will undoubtedly have implications for our 
educational theories and practices, but perhaps of more consequence 
are the implications that it will have for feminist theory. If John 
Dewey’s philosophy proves useful to feminist educational ideals, that 
is, if it proves serviceable for the feminist political act of teaching, 
what then does feminism secure? Is feminism at a point in its 
evolution where it can assume and implement aspects of an 
educational theory seemingly outside of its own tradition? 
Though the point can be made that any time is a good time to 
consider philosophical postures, this particular consideration is timely 
for several reasons. 
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First is feminism's renewed interest in the American pragmatic 
philosophical tradition. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried points out in 
her article "Where Are All the Pragmatist Feminists?" American 
pragmatism has "resources for feminist theory untapped by other 
approaches" and adds that, in turn, feminism can "uniquely 
reinvigorate pragmatism" (Seigfried, 1991, p. 2). Seigfried argues that 
the compatibility of these two traditions, rooted in a liberal base, 
warrants attention from feminists. Feminism and American 
pragmatism, according to Seigfried, hold similar positions regarding 
the relationship between experience and meaning, the aligning of 
theory and praxis. Both positions are critical of positivistic scientific 
methodology and each emphasizes the aesthetic informing experience 
and the validity of social, cultural and political analyses (Seigfried, 
1991, p. 5). 
Pragmatism, asserts Seigfried, is suitable for feminist 
restructuring because of its desire to "dismantle the social and 
political structures of oppression and to develop better alternatives" 
(Seigfried, 1991, p. 2). According to Seigfried, the "better 
alternatives" proposed by pragmatism are 
criticisms of positivist interpretations of scientific methodology; 
disclosure of the value dimension of factual claims; reclaiming 
aesthetics as informing everyday experience; linking of 
dominant discourses with domination; subordinating logical 
analysis to social, cultural and political issues; realigning theory 
and praxis; and resisting the turn to epistemology and instead 
emphasizing concrete experience (1991, p. 5) 
These "alternatives" suggest to me that pragmatists had a vision 
of the individual that could not be solitary nor detached but engaged in 
active and intentional correspondence with the social world. It would 
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seem that the pragmatist's individual, informed by everyday 
experience, had to be engaged in a reciprocal relationship with others. 
This idea is expressed by Dewey in Human Nature and Conduct when 
he writes that "for human beings, the environing affairs directly 
important are those formed by the activities of other human beings" 
(1922, p. 84). That the individual is constantly informed by others 
suggests to me that the pragmatic conception of the social and of the 
individual could not be dualistic and dichotomous. For how can the 
correspondence of individuals, how can this reciprocal relationship 
not be fueled (at some level) by shared interests? 
Seigfried's suggestion that feminists reclaim American 
pragmatism is important to this particular inquiry because it 
introduces perhaps the most salient point of this work: that by 
neglecting to consider a past philosophical position, we stand to lose 
the opportunity to reappropriate what is useful I agree with Seigfried 
when she asserts that there is a feminine side to pragmatism, a side 
for which it was "relegated to the margins" (Seigfried, 1991, p. 5). 
Pragmatism's criticism of positivistic interpretation of scientific 
methodology, its belief in aesthetics informing everyday experience 
and emphasis on concrete experience and not on epistemology are 
positions which Seigfried asserts are both feminist and pragmatic 
(1991, p. 5). In effect, its philosophical marginalization may have been 
the result of these positions, positions which feminism champions 
today. 
So why specifically John Dewey? Together with Charles Sanders 
Pierce, William James, Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead, John 
Dewey fashioned the American pragmatism that I suggest is so 
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compatible with feminist thinking. Why not consider one of these 
other American pragmatists? 
Feminists address social issues which affect women in particular 
and humanity in general. Dewey's pragmatic philosophy was social 
criticism and, like other pragmatists, called for the inclusion of 
multiple and varied perspectives (Seigfried, 1991, p. 14). Present day 
feminists such as Maria Lugones, bell hooks and Trinh T. Minh-ha 
echo these very concerns. But John Dewey is the focus of this 
particular consideration because it is Dewey who recognized that 
philosophy and education were one and the same. John Dewey 
reasoned that in order to solve social problems, philosophers and 
theorists must actively engage themselves in educational discourse. In 
his autobiographical essay titled "From Absolutism to 
Experimentalism" Dewey addresses this very point: 
Although a book called Democracy and Education was for many 
years that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully 
expounded, I do not know that philosophic critics, as distinct 
from teachers, have ever had recourse to it. I have wondered 
whether such facts signified that philosophers in general, 
although they are themselves usually teachers, have not taken 
education with sufficient seriousness for it to occur to them that 
any rational person could actually think it possible that 
philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme 
human interest in which, moreover, other problems, 
cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head. (Dewey, 1960, 
p. 14) 
Dewey valued education because it was that concrete experience 
where all theories were tested. His pragmatism positions education as 
the center of a philosophical circle. This fact alone invites feminist 
educational theorists to engage in a critical consideration of his work. 
The reasons for a feminist consideration of John Dewey extend beyond 
this, however. 
At the heart of feminist theory, no matter what brand we 
consider, there is a rejection of dualisms and universals, and a belief in 
the union of theory and practice. John Dewey provided us with an 
educational theory in which practice and theory are integrated and a 
posteriori reasoning is valued. Nancy Hartsock discussed these issues 
ten years ago in Building Feminist Theory, but they are still relevant 
today. 
Hartsock's feminist method stresses the examination of 
experience, an examination which is through our senses as well as 
through our intellect. It is a methodology where connections are 
drawn between personal experience and generality, and in which our 
understanding of the social world is derived from human association 
(Hartsock, 1981, p. 32). In their critique of feminist research, Liz 
Stanley and Sue Wise discuss the need for connection between theory 
and practice, a relationship which demands the absence of traditional 
dualisms and dichotomies (Stanley & Wise, 1983). The emphasis on 
objectivity, an integral player in the traditional Western paradigms of 
knowledge, suggests that knowers and the objects of their knowledge 
are separated and that knowledge is free of social influence. 
Feminist theorist Lorraine Code argues this very point in her 
analysis of subjectivity, further stressing the need for feminism to 
dismiss such dichotomies as subjective/objective. As Code writes, in a 
feminist framework, "dichotomies are especially problematic in that 
they posit exclusionary constructs, not complementary or 
interdependent ones" (1991, p. 29), imposing boundaries "unduly 
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restrictive" (p. 28). And, if, as Code suggests, feminist theory seeks to 
acquire an understanding of the experiential world, and I would agree 
that it does, we must consider not so much the origins of dichotomy 
but rather, the interaction between these so called opposites and the 
continuum in between. Experience can not and does not exist solely 
within two polarities, or at least such has been the case in my short 
life. I can think of few experiences which seem to be categorically 
either/or. Further, I suggest that we may find that identifying reality 
as non-linear, allows us to validate reciprocity between the knower 
and the known, confirming the richness of experience and its primary 
role in feminist learning. 
Dewey made it quite clear throughout his lifetime that adhering 
to dualistic philosophies created barriers which prevented the "fluent 
and free intercourse" between women and men (Dewey, 1916, p. 333). 
In effect, noted Dewey, a tradition of dualistic thinking set up the 
"different types of life-experience, each with isolated subject matter, 
aim and standard of values [which marked off) social groups and 
classes within a group; like those between rich and poor, men and 
women, noble and basebom, ruler and ruled"(1916, p. 333). Dualistic 
thinking was for Dewey, a limiting philosophy. The either/or 
characteristic of dualistic thinking separated the knower from the 
known, disregarding the impact of real experience on meaning. 
Knowledge, Dewey claimed, is a perception of the connections 
between the knower and the known, and "an ideally perfect 
knowledge" would reflect the "network of interconnections that any 
past experience would offer a point of advantage from which to get at 
the problem presented in a new experience" (1916, p. 340). The 
13 
multiple meanings of reality were for Dewey a result of the 
connections made between the knower and the known and not a 
product of indifferent dualistic reasoning. 
Dewey viewed the early 20th century advances in physiology and 
psychology as evidence that the ancient dualism of mind and body held 
no reasonable ground. As a naturalist, Dewey viewed mind and body as 
organic entities which are never separated from experiential reality. 
Mind, in Dewey's view, emerged from action and not from spiritual 
providence. As the body is involved in interdependent experiences, 
mind emerges as that capacity to foresee a future possibility, and as 
the ability to engage in "precisely intentional purposeful activity 
controlled by perception of facts and relationships to one another" 
(Dewey, 1916, p. 103). The sciences of physiology and psychology 
certified for Dewey the organic verity of the mind. The brain, as an 
organ of knowing, is not isolated from the other bodily organs, 
especially those of response. The brain is the body's "machinery" for 
the reciprocal adjustment between stimuli and responses. It is not an 
isolated, nor purely receptive and passive entity. The mind, wrote 
Dewey, is not a "passive spectator of the universe" (1967, p. 15). Thus 
knowing could not be separate from the everyday human realities but 
rather a process of the "perception of those connections of an object 
which determines its applicability in a given situation" (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 340). In knowing, we reorganize realities in order to meet new 
conditions. Through interaction with universal matter, Dewey's 
"mind" and "body" work together to construct meaning and theory and 
direct future actions. The knower and the known in a Dewey an 
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framework are always bound to each other in a relational interplay of 
construction and reconstruction. 
The separation of mind and body was problematic for Dewey also 
because, in effect, it served to disassociate thought from our everyday 
occupations, and most importantly, grounded the "erroneous 
conception" that knowledge and social interests, and that individuality 
and freedom, were unrelated. If mind and body are separate, reasoned 
Dewey, then the individual mind must be unassociated with the 
organic world. It would follow that individual minds must be 
separated from each other (Dewey, 1916, p. 292). The purposes of a 
human sociality based on such dualistic thinking would certainly 
render individuals intellectually and socially irresponsible, a 
phenomenon Dewey saw as socially inefficient and immoral. 
Knowledge, for Dewey, requires knowing people. 
Much of the feminist educational discourse involves these same 
Deweyan ideas. Frances Maher, for example, sketches an "interactive 
pedagogy" which is Deweyan at its roots. In her 1985 article, 
"Pedagogies for the Gender-Balanced Classroom," Maher bases her 
pedagogical alternative on the belief that knowers and objects of their 
knowledge are indeed connected and socially influenced. 
Acknowledging that experiences are relevant to learning, Maher's 
"interactive pedagogy" integrates students' experiences into the 
subject matter. It recognizes that reality is "shaped by our gender and 
our sexuality, an identification which separates all class, race and 
cultural experiences into various male and female versions" (Maher, 
1985, p. 50). It is pedagogy which is inductive in nature, whose 
ultimate goal is "the creation of shared meaning through collective 
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problem-solving" (p. 51), rather than through the use of universal 
thruths and a priori reasoning. 
Dewey's Democracy and Education is a testament to his belief 
that knowledge is produced in multiple contexts. By "conceiving the 
connections between ourselves and the world in which we live" 
(Dewey, 1916, p. 344), he writes, we are able to learn and thus able to 
know. The fact that he constructs his school to be most like society is 
an indication that he values the opportunities for learning available 
outside of the transmission of information characteristic of our 
educational tradition. "Learning in school should be continuous with 
that out of school" and "free interplay between the two" must take 
place (Dewey, 1916, p. 358). Thus for Dewey, an "ideally perfect 
knowledge" would embody a "network of interconnections" (Dewey, 
1916, p. 340). 
Because Dewey assigns the nature of experience a personal/ 
individual quality, we can presume that feminism would find his views 
on knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge acceptable. Belenky, 
Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule suggest that knowledge implies 
"personal acquaintance with an object" and an "intimacy" between the 
self and the object (Belenky, 1986, p. 101). Dewey utters much the 
same when he declares that "every act of mind involves relation" and 
that "all knowledge occurs in the medium of feeling" (Dewey, 1967, 
pp. 205, 215). He furthers this idea when he writes 
There is no consciousness which exists as wholly objectified, 
that is, without connection with some individual. There is, in 
other words, no consciousness which is not feeling. (Dewey, 
1967, p. 215) 
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Death, for example, is something which exists in the universe. We 
experience the death of a loved one and come to know "loss" through 
the medium of feeling. In many ways, the "inaccessible knowledge and 
passion within" women that Mary Daly identifies, becomes more 
"readily accessible" (Daly, 1984, pp. 235-237) in Dewey's ideology. 
Feminist educational philosophies, then, bare striking 
resemblance to John Dewey's educational treatise. But to say that 
John Dewey's and feminist educational philosophies are compatible or 
congruous is not adequate given the definition of and possibilities in 
consideration. More importantly, it is inadequate for the purposes of 
this essay. A goal of consideration is the possibility of reappropriating 
the useful and as such, it will be necessary to present what feminist 
educational theorists can reappropriate from Dewey. The last and 
concluding chapter will present what our consideration has 
determined may be useful, and in the process, inject a cautionary word 
about the hazards of dismissing the knowledge of the past, the hazards 
of our outlooks. 
In this concluding chapter titled "The Hazards of Outlook, " I 
consider the implications of philosophical outlook as it pertains to the 
feminist educator. For the feminist educator, gaining insight from an 
established tradition and taking what is most useful is both practical 
and constructive. Establishing such a perspective is, as the founder of 
the New York Feminist Theatre Lucy Winer suggests, "very difficult 
and complicated" (1981, p. 304). She warns that the feminist project 
must maintain distance, yet still be able to focus on what is useful in 
the cultural heritage being observed. But as feminist educational 
theorists, we must recognize that we have, as feminists, a special 
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vantage point that marginality affords. Similar to black women’s 
"special vantage point," we must, as bell hooks demands of black 
women, criticize, envision and create (1984, p. 15). 
Making this consideration timely for yet another reason is the 
discussion among contemporary feminists about the "second wave" of 
white American feminism and its need to include the Third World 
women's perspectives in its theoretical framework. Feminists such as 
bell hooks, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Gloria Anzaldua, Cherrie Moraga 
and Maria Lugones write about the exclusion of Third World women in 
feminist mainstream thought, explaining that Third World women and 
their experiences are unrecognizable in these theories. Lugones 
writes: 
I think that the fact that we are so ill at ease with your 
theorizing [about Third World women] does indicate that there 
is something wrong with these theories. But what is it that is 
wrong? Is it simply that these theories are flawed if meant to be 
universal but accurate so long as they are confined to your 
particular group(s)? Is it that the theories need to be 
translated? Is it something about the process of theorizing that 
is flawed?...Where do we begin? (Lugones & Spelman, 1983, 
p. 578) 
This contemporary issue in feminist theory relates directly to 
our inquiry. Feminism, like any other theory, must engage in many 
dialogues out of necessity. If feminist theory is to evolve, deepen and 
extend its understanding of our worlds, then its theorists must stop 
and consider the "vastness of the territor[ies]" placed before them. 
Issues of gender, multi-cultural and racial differences are pressing 
issues for present-day feminist theorists. As feminist theorists, we 
must engage in critical inquiries of our pasts and presents, all the 
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while, "nourish[ing] the critical spirit of inquiry [that] is always 
creative" (Freire, 1972, p. 17). 
This critical consideration of John Dewey's philosophy examines 
his views on the individual and sociality. Each of these is certainly 
relevant in any discussion of any form of feminism but their selection 
as points to examine and give thought to is intentional in another way. 
I suspect that how we construct knowledge and our view of ourselves 
and our socialities are inextricably bound together. Each in a myriad 
of ways, dictates the shape, form and expression of the others and 
consequently, has implications for a feminist project. Like Dewey, I 
am interested in change and growth through continuous self-renewal, 
and more to the point, believe that an educative experience gives us 
"an added power of subsequent direction and control" (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 77). This investigation is a process and not an end in itself. We 
engage in this consideration hoping that the process will educate us, 
and as feminists, serve to "add power" to our many directions, and 
"acarrear con orgullo las tareas de deshelar corazones y cambiar 
conciencias (to carry with pride the task of thawing hearts and 
changing consciousness)" (Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. 5). 
CHAPTER 2 
ABOUT SOCIALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
All feminisms struggle in some way or another to find the 
connections between self/individual and the group/sociality. It is 
indeed a struggle given the prevalence of Western dualistic ideas of 
the individual and society which place each at odds with the other. 
Feminisms, on the other hand, where "the personal is political," view 
self and identity as undeniably related to sociality and solidarity but 
find that in our personal, political and social worlds, this unity of 
concepts is largely absent. 
John Dewey's educational philosophy embodied an uneasiness 
with the tensions between the individual and sociality inherent in 
dualistic thinking. What can we learn from considering Dewey's 
revisionist concepts of the individual and sociality? Can we discover 
the connectedness which seems so vital to feminist ends, and 
particularly to feminist educational ambitions? bell hooks writes that 
"to change and transform (our concepts ofl self and society will 
determine the fate of the feminist revolution" (1991, p. 108). Will 
Dewey's construction of the individual and sociality help fuel "the 
feminist revolution"? 
In Meditations on Modem Political Thought Jean Bethke 
Elshtain remarks that feminism reflects the tensions between 
individualism and the common good and between individual rights and 
sociality" (1986, p. 56). It is a reflection, notes Elshtain, which is 
characterized by individuals with shared purposes and collective 
identities. Recent feminist scholarship fleshes out the tension 
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Elshtain describes, suggesting that perhaps the tension between the 
individual and the group, in actuality, is thicker and more complex 
(Fox-Genovese, 1991). It is a tension which is the result of a tradition 
whose definition of the individual and of society sets the two in 
opposition. The use of the term "tension" alone connotes a 
contrariety, an antithesis between the two conceptions. 
Let's begin here, then, with the idea that feminism reflects the 
tension between two concepts supposedly in opposition and suggest 
that a feminist conception of the individual and the social is 
characteristically harmonious and cohesive. This is the starting point 
of this chapter's consideration. 
In this chapter, we will look at Dewey's conceptualization of the 
individual and of sociality, a term which I will use to refer to his 
notions of social life—life within groups, society at large and 
community, the fact and condition of being associated with others. We 
will look at how Dewey envisioned the coalescence of the individual 
and sociality, how his concept of democracy is that social state which 
unifies the individual and society. What we will find is that Dewey 
resolves the purported tension producing conflict between the 
individual and the social not by redefining these terms in the strictest 
sense but by untangling its tradition, dissecting its evolution and 
reassembling its definition. In many ways, Dewey's fusion of the 
individual and the social was a reconsideration necessary for the 
attainment of what he viewed as a moral and ethical social order. 
Our consideration must include a discussion of Dewey's notion of 
democracy given that it is through this particular conception of social 
order that the individual and the social are integrated. After having 
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considered Dewey's model for sociality, democracy, we will engage in 
a consideration of feminist models. How each model can or can not 
bring about the integration of the social with the individual, and how 
each addresses or concerns itself with real world issues, for example, 
socio-economic class, is a part of our inquiry. Finally, we will consider 
what, if anything, we can reappropriate as a result of this critical 
consideration of Deweyan individuality and sociality. 
Let's now consider John Dewey's conceptualizations of the 
individual and of community. Let's consider whether his fusion of the 
individual and the social can resolve the tensions reflected in 
feminism, the existence of which makes this consideration once again 
timely. 
2.1 Deweys "Community"Group,” and "Society" 
In Democracy and Education Dewey writes that society and 
community are equivocal terms. Society, he says, is "conceived as one 
by its very nature" and the qualities which make up this oneness are 
those which are emphasized by solidarity. The qualities he attributes 
to this unity are "praiseworthy community of purpose and welfare, 
loyalty to public ends, mutuality of sympathy" (p. 82). Society then, 
should have a shared alliance of interests, objectives and standards, 
and a concern for the common good. The implication is that in 
Dewey's society individual interests aren't antithetical to those of the 
group and taken a step further, that individual rights within the social 
unit are not suppressed nor are their 'rights' denied. In a very early 
paper, Dewey assembles a definition of democracy which injects an 
'organic' interpretation of the individual and society. He views society 
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as a whole and perfect organism existing for and by individuals. As an 
integral part of the whole, individuals are not socially isolated units but 
rather constitute the spirit and will of all (Dewey, 1888). Though in 
his early writings Dewey's individual was defined within a Hegelian 
ideal and though Dewey's later writings don't have such a quality, he 
continued to believe that the ultimate interests of individuals and 
society were indeed reconcilable. 
As several scholars, such as Frederick Schultz have concluded, 
the differences between Dewey's "society" and "community" are 
unclear. In The Public and Its Problems, a text in which Dewey 
directly addresses communal living, Dewey implies that a society can 
be transformed into a community, giving the impression that 
communal living is of a higher social order or, at the very least, a more 
advanced form of associated living. 
In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey writes that the "Great 
Society" can be transformed through intelligent action into the "Great 
Community." What he viewed as the "Great Society" was the 1920's 
pre-Depression America which was rapidly advancing in technology 
and industry. Dewey, however, saw such advancement as both positive 
and problematic. In effect, he reasoned, the rise of technology 
controlled by private profit and a "money culture," prevented the Great 
Society from acknowledging shared concerns and achieving shared 
ends. Acknowledging shared concerns and achieving mutual goals was 
a characteristic of local groups and communities which Dewey viewed 
as central and primary for the Great Community to evolve. What he 
envisioned was greater social cohesiveness, larger and an infinitely 
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more inclusive union of human beings, across and between groups, 
across and between societies. 
In order to transform "society" into "community," Dewey 
reasoned that members would have to be aware of and acknowledge 
mutual concerns and develop the method of intelligence to bring about 
mutually agreed upon ends. In effect, we have to be willing to see that 
our own individual concerns are similar to, if not the same as, those of 
others. To do this requires a method of intelligence reflecting the 
relationship between community and communication, and 
communication and intelligence. In the modem, technological life, 
Dewey purported, a life focused on material gain is incapable of seeing 
and acknowledging the relevance of others’ concerns to our own. He 
reasoned that our ability to become aware of our connections is 
ultimately what enables us to form communities: 
The planets in constellation would form a community if they 
were aware of the connections of the activities of each with 
those of others. (1927, p. 25) 
Thus, given that as humans we have the capacity for awareness—the 
capacity for intelligence—we should be able to engage in communal 
life. The suggestion is that individual intelligence will enable us to 
understand that sharing mutual concerns and aims is advantageous for 
all, and that this in itself resolves the "conflict" between the individual 
and society. Though Dewey never explicitly says that in achieving 
"community" the individual and society are reconciled and made 
cohesive, my reading suggests that such is the case with Dewey. 
It is important to state and make note of the fact that Dewey's 
"community" is not a static sociality. Dewey's community is always 
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incomplete, always emerging. Each generation, in Dewey s view, 
should re-interpret the human condition, the passions, canons, and 
customs of the previous generations (Dewey, 1927, p. 154). This 
makes sense given that Dewey's community is achieved through 
interaction, through participation in associated life. With each new 
generation, with each new advance in human intelligence, it becomes 
necessary to assess, to consider the value of a previous standard in 
order to progress personally and socially. 
"Society" for Dewey is really "societies," the many and different 
forms of human association. Society is not a useful term for Dewey. 
Instead, he suggests in Individualism: Old and New that it is better to 
think in terms of "law, industry, religion, medicine, politics, art, 
education, philosophy" and to think of these in the plural. He asks us 
to think of society not in "huge and large ways," but rather as 
"avenues": law, industry, religion, etc. It is via these avenues that we 
act upon the world and the world acts upon us (1929, p. 166). These 
"avenues" are the conditions in which the multiple and varied forms of 
interactions between individuals take place, according to Dewey. 
Thus, it would follow, that because human interactions vary from 
person to person, across time, and because these are not static 
interactions capable of being repeated precisely the same way twice, 
"society" can not be static either. 
2.2 Dewey’s Individual and Society 
The requirement that individual personality develop with the 
influence of societal interactions suggests that Dewey firmly integrated 
individual and society. Thinking of the individual and society as 
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opposing abstractions was for Dewey a sure way of preventing true 
social thinking. In reality, he reasoned, the individual and the social 
are just categories through which we can gain an understanding of our 
worlds. To think of either the "individual" or "Society" as a singular, 
particular entity defined by some abstract, general idea, dismisses the 
facts of association and interaction. The individual is not the "spatially 
isolated thing our imagination inclines to take it to be," remarks 
Dewey (1927, p. 187). Instead, Dewey's individual is a collection of 
particular potentialities which are elicited and validated through 
association. In a way, Dewey views the term "individual" as a general 
term which can not fully describe all of its particular manifestations. 
The beliefs, purposes, passions and actions of individuals are due to 
the influences of their associations and interactions, interactions 
which are not one-way transactions between the "individual" and an 
ambiguous "Society." Relations are between individuals and not 
between individuals and Society. And it is in this relation, this "social 
medium," that individuals live. It is through and because of associated 
life or "social medium" that individuals are "influenced by 
contemporary and transmitted culture, whether in conformity or 
protest. The culture of a period is a determining influence in the 
"arrangement of the native constituents of human nature. What is 
generic and the same everywhere is at best the organic structure of 
man, his biological make-up" (Dewey, 1927, p. 195). 
Dewey's individual is not a function of a "ready-made" human 
nature. As a living organism, Dewey's individual is a "temporal 
development" whose uniqueness in history is not "something given 
once for all at the beginning which then proceeds to unroll as a ball of 
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yam may be unwound" (1960, p. 230). The potentialities of individuals 
develop through interactions with cultural conditions, an assertion he 
defends by stating that if human nature were a relative constant", it 
could not account for the multitude of diversities" (1939, p. 19). As an 
unshaped potentiality, a possibility or capacity for becoming actual, 
Dewey's individuality is incomplete and takes shape only through 
interactions with real situations. Dewey's individual is not 
a mere property of nature, set in place according to a scheme 
independent of him, as an article is put in its place in a cabinet, 
but he adds something, that he makes a contribution. (Dewey, 
1925, p. 172) 
For Dewey, the idea that human nature is inherently 
individualistic, ie., egocentric and narcissistic, is a product of a 
cultural condition he called the "cultural individualistic movement" 
characteristic of the traditions of 18th century liberalism and 
American democracy (Dewey, 1939). The "liberalism" Dewey 
disdained so vehemently is the outgrowth of several social forces, two 
of which, Locke's "natural rights" philosophy and the doctrine of 
laissez-faire, he found particularly inimical. The "natural rights" 
philosophy of the late 1600's which created the belief that individual 
needs were primary, and the laissez-faire doctrine which gave rise to 
an individual economic blindness were, for Dewey, primarily 
responsible for the polarization of individual and the social. Even the 
Church, with its emphasis on the salvation of the individual soul 
seemed to add to the invention of polarity (Dewey, 1930). 
The individualism Dewey insisted on is not the "old 
individualism" which held the interests and rights of the individual as 
primary. This "old individualism," had its roots in the individualistic 
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sentiments which rose to prominence in 18th and 19th century 
England and France. This particular brand of individualism, he felt, 
gave power and freedom to few. In Chapter V of Individualism: Old 
and New he provides us with a sketch of the "new Individualism" 
which stresses the interconnections of the "vast complex of 
associations" in the modern technological world. These connections, 
he insisted, introduce harmony and cohesiveness to the state of 
society (Dewey, 1930, pp. 74-100). 
This "old" individualism, Dewey writes, is the consequence of 
medieval and feudal institutions, institutions which were the means of 
accomplishing the eternal happiness of the soul, and the secular 
industrial revolution which fostered the belief that the essential 
characteristic of all individuals was a motivation for personal gain. 
Under the influence of Protestantism, individual capitalism, a natural 
rights philosophy and morals based on "strictly individual traits and 
values" flourished. The American version of this individualism took 
things a step further and "equated personal gain with social [economic 
and class] advance" (Dewey, 1929, pp. 75-77). 
The problem with this individualism, purported Dewey, is that 
in the modem, industrial and technological world, because institutions 
are run for private, personal profit, institutional aims are not social 
aims. Industry and technology are private endeavors, avenues to 
personal, private, individual profit. Individual aims in this view, are 
"narrow" aims, purely driven by the motivation for individual monetary 
wealth and social class status. The interest in private profit created 
our "money culture," a culture which Dewey believed could not allow 
us to see, and thus address, our purposeful sociality. 
28 
Dewey's "new" individualism, in contrast, merged the personal 
with the social (Dewey, 1930). Dewey's individual should, in a sense, 
have an integrated individuality whose aims are not purely personal, 
nor purely social. Such an individuality, he insisted, is not a ready¬ 
made essentially human characteristic. It is a capacity for 
development which is always incomplete and evolving. Given this, it 
becomes absolutely critical for the environment to provide those 
conditions under which such potentialities can emerge and be 
confirmed. For Dewey, communication, intelligence and interaction 
appear to be those conditions necessary for the development of an 
integrated individual. 
What we see in Dewey's concepts of individual, individualism, 
and individuality, is similar to what we saw in his construction of 
sociality. The terms appear to blend into each other, to be parts of a 
larger, more comprehensive human process. Each is something to be 
achieved; none is a fixed mold. None are absolute, but rather, each is 
relative. Nothing about each term seems automatic. It is as if 
"individual," "individuality," and "individualism" are but parts of a 
dynamic composite called human being. 
Thus it was Dewey's contention that the supposed opposition 
between the individual and society was the result of social forces 
designed to legitimize those prevailing individual rights ideologies. In 
"Time and Individuality" he makes this point quite clearly when he 
writes; 
The weakness of the philosophy originally advanced to justify the 
democratic movement was that it took individuality to be 
something given ready-made; that is, in abstraction from time, 
instead of as a power to develop. (1960, p. 242) 
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The result of a cultural interaction then, should not be construed as an 
inherent "nature" or predisposition. Cultural conditions develop 
individuality, along with genetic inheritance, as a result of unique 
interactions, therefore, one can not say that human nature is innately 
individualistic. On the contrary, Dewey's comments imply that the 
social is part and parcel of the individual, that it is an essential, 
integral and constituent element of the individual. Further, he holds 
that "the spirit of personality indwells in every individual and that the 
choice to develop it must proceed from that individual" (Dewey, 1888, 
p. 22). 
In Ethics, though Dewey does not deny the uniqueness of each 
individual, he makes the case that there are many individuals and that 
there is no one single society or form of association. The conflicts 
which have traditionally been viewed as conflicts between classes or 
groups are conflicts which exist between some individuals and some 
groups, not between the constructs "individual" and "society." 
Conflicts such as those between the dominant class and the rising 
class, between private enterprise and public agencies, between the 
conservative and the liberal or radical have led to the belief that the 
struggles arise from the antagonism between the individual and 
society. It is the conflict of interests between these groups that really 
creates social disputes, Dewey contends (Dewey, 1908, pp. 358-363). 
But if there is a constant in humans, Dewey would contend that 
it is the fact that humans are a part of nature and, as such, are social 
beings. Plainly put, "individuals are social by nature" (Dewey, 1930, 
p. 82), and as social beings, they are likely to encounter conditions 
which will develop a myriad of potentialities, of which individuality 
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and sociality are inevitable. Human associations can, therefore, not be 
external but rather are defined by the intricacies of relationship and 
interaction (Dewey, 1930, p. 82). We are not just de facto associated. 
The very fact that interaction has consequences means that we affect 
"society" in some way. Though we may think and act individually, the 
consequences are the result of interaction. We are not just actually 
associated; we are implicated by our associations. 
We become social animals in the make-up of ideas, sentiments 
and through purposeful behavior. What one believes, desires, and 
strives toward is the result of interaction and engagement (Dewey, 
1927, p. 13). He even proposes that the human dilemma is to protect 
"the development of each constituent (individuality and sociality) so 
that it serves to release and mature the other" (1939, p. 22), a 
suggestion that leads one to suspect that in a Deweyan scheme, the 
private and public spheres may be integrated. In The Human 
Condition Hannah Arendt states: 
No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's 
wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or 
indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings. All 
human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live 
together... (1958, p. 22) 
It is this same idea that Dewey suggests when he states that humans 
are a part of nature and, as such, are social beings. 
This mutual dependence between the individual and the social 
which Dewey submits is characterized by a reciprocity of interests and 
varied inter- and intra- group actions. The individuals in Dewey's 
social unit share purposes, are mutually sympathetic and are loyal to 
the group's aims. The "worth" of the group can thus be measured by 
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t±ie degree to which interests are shared among group members and 
the cooperation with other groups. The "standard" for measuring the 
worth is one which assures that the ideal society is not the 
benchmark. Rather, Dewey's criteria avoids this extreme, suggesting a 
"practicable" appraisal. Worth is thus assessed by the degree to which 
the interests consciously shared are "numerous and varied" and by 
"how full and free" the interactions are with other groups (Dewey, 
1916, p. 83). If there is minimal common interest between members 
and if that interest isolates the group, "barriers to free intercourse and 
communication of experience" are assured. Such barriers, asserts 
Dewey, make the group or social unit or society "undesirable." The 
more fruitful the association and intercourse between human beings, 
the greater their experience. The greater their experience, the more 
progressive an individual's growth. And progressive growth, according 
to Dewey, is the distinguishing trait of intelligence, a society's most 
important asset (Dewey, 1916, pp. 81-99). 
What other attributes of individuality does Dewey suggest are 
compatible with those of sociality? Does Dewey examine these 
idiosyncrasies as they are actually expressed? In the Ethics of 
Democracy Dewey's discourse on the difference between a true 
democracy and aristocracy addresses these questions. 
According to Dewey, aristocracy has failed to assert true 
individuality because its members have "ceased to remain wise and 
good." They have "become ignorant of the needs and requirements of 
the many" and leave the many outside the pale with no real share in 
the commonwealth" (1888, p. 20). He goes on to say that the 
aristocracy "limits the range of men... in the unity of purpose and 
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destiny; and it always neglects to see that those theoretically included 
really obtain their well being" (1888, p. 21). Even when the aristoi 
engage in philanthropic organizations, Dewey claims that this is "good 
which is procured from without" and is not a "realization... of the 
unified spirit of community" (1888, p. 21-22). He is suggesting that 
personal responsibility, individual initiation, and unity of purpose must 
begin with the individual, that "personality is the first and final reality" 
(1888, p. 23). This individualism that is ethical, responsible and 
lawful is a trustworthy element in his conception of personality. It is 
"the one thing of permanent and abiding worth" and from it "result the 
other notes of democracy, liberty, equality and fraternity" (1888, 
p. 23). 
It seems that Dewey is assigning to all individuals a potentiality 
which when fully and freely realized, is in accord with the ideals of 
sociality. It would be erroneous to deduce from this implication that 
humans are all of the same "nature". Dewey underscores the term 
"potentiality" and means just that, the ability to develop into existence. 
Further, this is only a most general potentiality and it's clear that he 
values those potentialities which realize themselves through the 
democratic process. Liberty and equality are all individual 
potentialities which are developed within the democratic process but 
individuals may choose to develop this potentiality or may choose 
against it. The appropriate cultural conditions must be present for 
this potential to be realized and, as could be expected, it is education's 
role to set forth these conditions, conditions democracy can 
engender. 
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2.3 The Union of the Individual and Sociality 
How does Dewey's democracy unify the individual and society? 
How does democracy bring about the "perfect man in perfect state" 
(Dewey, 1888, p. 19)? 
Dewey's democracy is much more than a form of government. 
As an ethical alliance, it brings about a moral individualism which 
connects the individual with others in society. In many ways, Dewey 
denied many of our religious traditions which grant the individual a 
spiritual intimacy with God and, instead, purported that such spiritual 
intimacy was between individuals (Dewey, 1930; 1916, p. 122). He 
goes on to submit that the individual is the means for democracy and 
exacts on the individual the responsibility for attaining democratic 
ends. This is a classic Dewey equation: means and ends, process and 
objective, growth and experience, individual and society all interactive 
and constantly renewing. The individual must be able to adjust and 
redefine, a course which Western religious traditions obstruct. For 
Dewey, these traditions dictated "fixed and comprehensive goals" for 
the individual, objectives which distanced humans from nature. The 
religious concepts of mortality and immortality turned humans away 
from the good of all and toward the good of self (Dewey, 1930). 
Democracy, it would follow, must not separate individuals from nature 
and must provide the opportunity for individual growth. 
The democratic arrangement urged by John Dewey has as its 
means and ends the integration of the individual and society. More 
than a political order, Deweyan democracy is a means for realizing 
truly social goals. It is "a way of life, social and individual." As a way of 
life, it is expressed as 
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the necessity for the participation of every mature human being 
in formation of the values that regulate men living together: 
which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general 
social welfare and the full development of human beings as 
individuals. (Dewey, 1937, p. 457) 
It is a human way of life which requires in its practice "universal 
suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in 
political power to the voters" (Dewey, 1937, p. 457). First and 
foremost, Deweyan democracy is a spirit, an attitude. It is a "spirit of 
understanding, sympathy, and cooperation within social classes and 
between social classes" (Horne, 1978, p. 112). 
At its core this vision of democracy is founded on the belief in 
the abilities of human beings, in their capacity for intelligence and in 
the vitality of collective sociality. Belief in an individual's entitlement 
to social equality, to freedom of social inquiry, to freedom of thought 
and expression are all elemental in this democracy and are necessary 
for the individual and society to live and work as one. As such, this 
democratic design approximates the ideal of all social systems 
because, as Dewey pronounces," the individual and society are organic 
to each other" (1888, p. 14). Mutual interests must then direct this 
truly democratic society and it follows that change must be the result 
of human associations. 
As a central point in Liberalism and Social Action Dewey 
proposes a democracy that is essentially a commitment to a 
"cooperative intelligence" as a "social asset." Through an organized 
intelligence, individuals in a democracy can bring claims out into the 
open and make wise decisions. A "freed intelligence as a social force" 
is a necessary condition for Dewey's democracy, a condition which can 
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be brought about by the "full development of the personality" through 
an education which 'frees' the individual’s capacity for progressive 
growth (1935, pp. 61-81). In this way, the individual can acquire a 
mind of his own, a mind not isolated from the "knowledge of things 
incarnate in the life about him." Thus the "intellectual variations of the 
individual" become agencies of social progress (Dewey, 1916, 
pp. 95-98). 
As a method for "getting knowledge and making sure that it is 
knowledge and not mere opinion" (Dewey, 1916, p. 339), the 
experimental method provided Dewey yet another means for proving 
that a dualistic theory of knowledge is only dogma and that a theory of 
knowing derived from practice, from experience, could stimulate free 
interchange and enrich social continuity. Dewey's conviction that full 
and free interactions are necessary for social progress is undeniably 
bound to his belief in the values of scientific/ experimental thinking. 
Genuinely democratic Deweyan sociality demands that each individual 
be free to engage in trial and error thinking, in hypothesis testing, and 
observation. The scope of an individual's experiences will 
consequently dictate the breadth and fullness of his thinking, which in 
turn, directs his sociality. Sociality, experience and thinking are all 
interwoven. Experience, practice, and theory; research, theory and 
experience, are in a dynamic, multi-dimensional interrelation that is 
by definition, value laden, concerned with the particular, and real. 
On the surface, John Dewey's insistence on the use of the 
scientific or experimental method to bring forward "cooperative 
intelligence" seems problematic for the feminist scholar. Is there 
value for us in such a tradition? Scientific methodology's emphasis on 
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"objectivity," and on deductive reasoning, present us with some 
ideological difficulties. For example, the importance placed on 
difference rather than sameness, on the visual rather than the tactile, 
and in the construction of generalizations rather than the concern for 
the particulars, appears to remove traditional scientific methodology 
from the purview of feminist inquiry (Hartsock, 1981; Stanley, 1983, 
p. 32-43). In Dewey's definition of scientific thinking, these issues are 
also ideologically problematic. 
For Dewey, deductive reasoning was not entirely worthless or 
without merit. Deductive reasoning, according to Dewey, could be 
used to "challenge attention" to a problem. But to engage in such 
reasoning without "first making acquaintance with the particular 
facts," leads one to close off possibilities, making inquiry inflexible and 
miseducative. "Acquaintance with the particular facts that create a 
need for definition and generalization" motivates a kind of inductive 
inquiry that is educative, that results in knowing (Dewey, 1933, 
p. 187). Dewey's distrust of deductive thinking was much in line with 
feminism's. What accepted beliefs had passed for knowledge, in 
Dewey's view, were the products of an accumulation of an authority's 
past opinions and had rarely, if ever, been tested by inductive 
experimental methods, or more importantly, been tested and 
validated by experience. Most knowledge, much of what one believed 
to be true, if it had been tested, was done deductively, a method 
Dewey described as "the only alternative to the imposition of dogma as 
truth, a procedure which reduced mind to the formal act of 
acquiescing in truth" (Dewey, 1916, p. 294). 
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Dewey's view of generalizations and their uses has much in line 
with feminism's suspicions of the phenomenon. He admits that 
scientific thinking's generalities give such thinking a "technicality and 
aloofness" but it is not because they are removed from practice 
(Dewey, 1916, p.228). Traditional theoretical speculations, argues 
Dewey, impose abstract knowledge on practice, making past 
experiences the "master" of the mind (p. 225). Generalizations are the 
"counterpart" of such abstractions, clarifying and guiding experience, 
providing a "wide and free survey." Generalizations derived from 
scientific thinking could serve as good "social devices" precisely 
because they were the results of "a wide and free survey" and not of 
restrictive, dogmatic views (pp. 226-227). For Dewey, scientific 
generalization was the view of any man in a particular place and time. 
Dewey's scientific method welcomed difference, or in his words, 
"unlikeness." "Unlikeness" provides comparison and contrast, allowing 
us to make inferences and to understand the varieties of experience. 
Sameness, according to Dewey, prevents us from infering. He writes 
that when cases or objects of examination are duplicated, "we are no 
better off for purposes of inference than if we had permitted our 
single original fact to dictate a conclusion" (Dewey, 1933, p. 174). 
Dewey certainly would have been suspicious of scientific methodology 
whose only goal was repeated replication and its inference derived 
only from the statistically reliable. 
Dogma and beliefs originating in conceptualizations of the ideal, 
were for Dewey, "crutches" which relieved us of the responsibility of 
thinking and directing our actions (Dewey, 1916, p. 339). The 
development of experimental methodology, or scientific thinking, gave 
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Dewey a means to achieve true knowledge, knowledge that in his view 
was not opinion or "meanings supplied because of habit, prejudice, [or] 
by the vogue of existing theories" (Dewey, 1933, p. 172). Because 
Dewey believed that observation (experience) and thought were 
interrelated, the process of thinking had to involve the discrimination 
of what was experienced from what had been inferred or what had 
been held as true. The experimental method gave him the vehicle to 
achieve the exclusion of those judgments and conclusions which 
experience/observation proved false or mistaken. In effect, Dewey 
rejects those purely empirical qualities of some scientific thinking. 
Dewey viewed scientific thinking as a process which allows us to 
move from facts to ideas and back again from ideas to facts (Dewey, 
1933, p. 166). Such a dynamic involves the flexibility to adjust and re¬ 
adjust to changes in observations and experience, caused by changes 
in the environment and by the passing of time. A scientific 
methodology which is "purely empirical" can not, according to Dewey, 
cope with the novel and, consequently, has a "tendency to lead to false 
beliefs" (Dewey, 1933, p. 192). Belief which has a "purely empirical" 
character is, for Dewey, the result of observation without an 
understanding of connections. Seeing a connection between the 
occurrence of thunder and lightning, for example, without 
understanding the why and how of the connection is a purely 
empirical observation to Dewey (p. 190). A methodology rooted in 
pure empiricism was characteristically post hoc to Dewey. It 
suggested causality that was solely temporal and invariable. Such 
fixity, argued Dewey, would effect mental passivity and the likely 
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adherence to unfounded dogmatism, the result of which would be the 
social crippling of individuals. 
Change and the opportunity for growth are paramount in 
Deweyan thought, so his dismissal of purely empirical methodology 
makes sense. Change is a positive and progressive process in Deweyan 
thought. To deny or prevent or control the possibilities for change 
was, for Dewey, "fatal to progress" (Dewey, 1933, p. 194). Purely 
empirical methodology, according to Dewey, sets down the track for 
inquiry to follow, shutting out the novel or the variant. He writes: 
Empirical inference follows the grooves and ruts that custom 
wears and has no track to follow when the groove disappears. 
(Dewey, 1933, p. 193) 
Points of difference or unlikeness are therefore apt to be devalued or 
dismissed. Adhering to a such an empirically laden theory of 
knowledge will erase those opportunities for social change and human 
growth. Prevailing authority can never be challenged under such 
terms, another aspect Dewey found intolerable and which he 
punctuated in How We Think: 
Certain men or classes of men come to be the accepted 
guardians and transmitters - instructors - of established 
doctrines. To question the beliefs is to question their authority: 
to accept the beliefs is evidence of loyalty to the powers that be, 
a proof of good citizenship. Passivity, docility, acquiescence, 
come to be primal intellectual virtues. Facts and events 
presenting novelty and variety are slighted or are sheared down 
till they fit into the Procrustean bed of habitual belief. Inquiry 
and doubt are silenced by citation of ancient laws or a multitude 
of miscellaneous and unsifted cases. This attitude of mind 
generates dislike of change, and the resulting aversion to novelty 
is fatal to progress. What will not fit into the established canons 
is outlawed. (1933, p. 194) 
It seems, then, that Dewey viewed experimental methodology as 
a way of assuring intelligence as a social force. Speculations became 
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hypotheses in this view and thus subject to testing by others. The idea 
of reliability, that knowledge was subject to verification by others, was 
for Dewey, a way of assuring intellectual responsibility and verity, its 
value was not replication. Individuals engaged in knowing could 
question the authenticity of accepted beliefs and in that way, make all 
individuals accountable. Accepting blindly beliefs transmitted by 
custom was for Dewey, intellectual inertia but most importantly, 
certain to sustain an oppressive class hierarchy. Theories developed 
by those who were privileged were likely to be formed by their 
impressions of their worlds, by their impressions of the objects of 
their observations. Theory constructed in this way would be likely to 
fashion a view of reality based on a subject-object impression and not 
on practice. That objects of knowledge are separate from the knower 
is the centerpiece of the ideal of value-neutrality in scientific thinking. 
This idea that the observer remains unchanged during, through and 
after the investigation is an aspect of this type of scientific thinking 
which is unacceptable for feminists as well as Dewey. 
All of this suggests that Dewey's ideal democratic state would 
develop without a social class hierarchy. After all, would not 
intelligence guided by scientific reasoning enable us to engineer an 
alliance without social class distinctions? Interestingly enough, Dewey 
did not believe that a one-class social system could be the 
consequence of such a democratic spirit. On the contrary, his belief 
that social classes would be the result of the strength of individual 
talents implies that there would be some "sorting out"’ of individuals 
by virtue of their abilities. Sounding much like the Platonic "Postulates 
of Specialized Natures" (Martin, 1985, p. 13), social classes in Deweys 
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democracy would be the effect of the expression of individuals' talents. 
These talents, all of social use, would allow the social unit to be stable, 
but unlike those in Plato's Republic, would give rise to a dynamic 
society (Dewey, 1916, p. 88-91). As it is in the Platonic ideal state, 
Dewey's democracy requires that education, through the 
implementation of the scientific method, for the good of all, through 
the implementation of the experimental method, discover, nurture 
and direct individual aptitudes. Consequently, like Plato, education 
will be the vehicle through which Dewey's citizens will be stratified. 
But why haven't democratic societies been able to release the 
individualism so necessary for Dewey's ideal? In Liberalism and Social 
Action Dewey addresses this issue. For Dewey, the inability to achieve 
the democratic ideal is a function of several cultural conditions in 
human history: the subject-object formula of knowledge which led to 
the perception of individualism as being fundamentally a-social; John 
Locke's philosophy proposed that governments are created to protect 
individual rights from the claims of the social unit; the view that 
natural "rights" (rights to property, etc) held sovereign the individual 
over the masses; the belief that government was the instrument to 
secure and extend these rights; and Adam Smith's assurance that 
laissez-faire liberalism would benefit both the individual and society. 
What has resulted from these and extensions of these conditions is 
that "the word 'social' has come to be regarded as applicable to that 
which is institutionally established and which exerts authority" and, 
thus, the individualistic has become a departure from the social 
(Dewey, 1946, p. 295). Consequently, that which departs from the 
social must be anti-social. 
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In a rather strong statement Dewey also blames the profit motive 
(which he views as industrialization's traditional value) for "perverting 
[the] whole idea of individualism to conform to the practices of a 
pecuniary culture. It has become the source and justification of 
inequalities and oppressions" (1930, pp. 15-18). He continues in the 
same text by adding that "anthropologically speaking, we are living in a 
money culture" (p. 9). Cultural admiration of prestige, competition, 
power and money have provided for individuals the conditions to 
develop the economic individualism Dewey regarded as undemocratic. 
Dewey's solution to these ills is a democratic conception of 
education that widens "the area of shared concerns" and liberates the 
"greater diversity of personal capacities" (Dewey, 1916, p. 87). "What 
binds people together in cooperate human pursuits and results" 
(Dewey, 1916, p. 98) should be central to a democratic conception of 
education. Science and the scientific method of inquiry will allow for 
the development of intelligent thought which in turn, will bring about 
intelligent action. Guided by facts and not "custom, personal 
convenience and resentment" (Dewey, 1922, p. 319), scientific 
inquiry activates democratic education. 
In order for scientific thinking to serve as agent for the kind of 
education which will bind people together in common pursuits, Dewey 
must base his democratic education on concepts and beliefs which 
don't set the individual's aims at odds with those of the group. How, 
for example, will individuals form social classes which are not 
determined economically? He must, in effect, view human nature as 
characteristically social and somehow stay true to his belief in the 
integrity of the individual. He must, in my mind, consider those 
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concepts and beliefs inherited from a natural rights philosophy and 
consider how such ideals as autonomy can be at odds with the 
interdependency he values. Like feminists, Dewey must somehow 
struggle with the same tensions between autonomy and 
interdependence. If feminism is to reappropriate Dewey’s democratic 
theory in order to implement the fusion of the individual and the 
social, we must consider Dewey's views on autonomy and human 
nature. 
I began this chapter with Jean Bethke Elshtain's proposition 
that feminism reflected those tensions between liberalism s 
individualistic ethic common in Western thought and what Elshtain 
refers to as the "republican ideals" of collective identity and shared 
purposes (1986, p. 56) and ended with the proposition that perhaps 
Dewey's pluralistic democracy could provide the means for resolving 
these tensions. The question that remains then, is whether feminism, 
in all its multiple expressions, can reclaim and utilize Deweyan 
democratic theory, a theory I suggest may contain those "republican 
ideals." First let's consider liberalism's dichotomization of the 
individual and society, a "romantic vision" (hooks, 1984, p. 24) 
wherein the "self is in opposition to the "other" and where autonomy 
is valued over interdependence. 
As a concept inherited from 18th century natural rights 
philosophies, liberalism is truly a "romantic vision." As an ideal 
developed for the affluent Western male citizenry, it posits autonomy 
as a highly valued goal. A fully realized life in such a view, is the 
consequence of a self-sufficient individualism characterized by a state 
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of moral preparedness in which alienation and independence become 
the crowning events of a life lived well. 
The suggestion is that humans become fully realized only 
through progressive social disassociation. This would mean that an 
individual first bom into dependence, must purposely break the bonds 
of sociality and ultimately live, if not physically, at least spiritually, 
morally, and intellectually as an isolated being. Self-development 
would somehow lead an individual from dependence to independence, 
a paradigm implying a gradual shift towards the objectification of 
others and towards reliance on difference as reference to Self. 
Further, the need for this isolated being, one void of relational 
reciprocity, to maintain self-fulfillment, suggests that this ideal 
autonomy will necessarily need to control, dominate and oppress 
others. What follows is the likelihood that the dehumanization of 
those who for one reason or many are not allowed the right of self- 
governance, will be objectified and their realities marginalized, or 
worse, negated. Control over the unautonomous will surely rely on 
power. 
The concept of autonomy is an issue in this consideration 
because of the implications its has for interaction, experience, and 
growth. If only certain individuals can be self-governing, or have the 
right to be self-directive, then Dewey's sociality is impossible. A 
sociality dependent on the ability of individuals to engage in multiple 
and varied interactions requires that autonomy not be a right bestowed 
upon some but rather, a certainty for all individuals. What is really at 
issue for Dewey is an individual’s freedom to engage in the action or 
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experience, or in Dewey's vernacular, to engage in those "interactions" 
which give rise to intelligence. 
Dewey's sociality necessarily requires the freedom to be 
autonomous. It must have those "positive conditions, forming the 
prevailing state of culture," which release individuals from 
"oppressions and repressions" (Dewey, 1939, p. 7). In effect, it is a 
sociality which requires autonomy. In Deweyan sociality, it appears, 
individuals are free to self-direct, self-govem, or, simply put, choose 
for themselves. It is the freedom of self-determination which must 
characterize Dewey's "autonomy," not a right to act as one chooses. To 
have the opportunity for self-determination, to be able to ascertain 
what I want to do and to be able to act upon this, demands a vast and 
accessible experiential world to say the least. 
All this implies, of course, that the ideal of autonomy deeply 
entrenched in Western liberal thought is problematic for feminists. 
Feminist critiques of individualism, argues Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, are 
specifically focused on individualism's emphasis on the autonomy of 
the individual. She writes that: 
It is to individualism that we owe the model of autonomy, which 
so many feminist theorists are beginning to criticize as an 
inadequate image - much less goal - of human identity. (1991, 
p. 140) 
But why? Why is the ideal of an autonomous, self-reliant, self¬ 
ruling, self-directing and unrestricted person so problematic in 
feminist discourse? One can suggest that women could in theory 
successfully navigate this life principle and be the autonomous ideal 
beings our liberal tradition highly regards. This is the same tradition, 
after all, which is rooted in the belief in the human ability to choose 
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desired ends and demands that the state refrain from imposing upon 
individuals universal definitions of such things as happiness, good, 
health and prosperity. Why should feminists, feminists like bell hooks, 
find such a notion objectionable? Does not the liberal conception of 
autonomy contain some of the principles necessary for women to 
claim full and free participation in their worlds? But perhaps this 
vision of autonomy is part exaggerated fiction and part dark and dirty 
fact. 
What are these fictions and facts and what part do they play in 
Dewey's notions of the individual and sociality? 
Feminist theorists have de-mystified the concept of autonomy in 
a variety of ways. The concept of autonomy has been linked to the 
belief in the existence of a human nature. For feminists, this is an 
arbitrary assumption fashioned from male models of thought, 
especially those within the Greek, German idealistic and liberal 
philosophical traditions, which allow women to realize their 
personhood only as "conceptual men" (Snitow, 1990, p. 26). Such 
theories of human nature ascribe ideals of capacities and attributes 
which do not include women's experiences. As Lorraine Code 
comments: 
Feminists have been rightly concerned to contest the alleged 
'naturalness' of many capacities and characteristics. There is no 
doubt that appeals to 'human nature'...derive as much from 
political interests as from straight forward observation and 
description. Received theories of human nature are commonly 
constructs of a privileged intellectual elite and consistently 
derived from its own experiences. (1991, p. 43) 
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The very idea that humans have a nature, fixed in a masculine 
image and unalterable, suggests several things which are problematic 
for feminists, feminist educators and John Dewey. 
Feminist critiques of such theories of human nature focus on the 
value of reason and its determination of social role occupancy. Those 
human nature theories which exclude women and slaves from the 
specific human ability to reason are part of an Aristotelian legacy 
which has many implications for women in particular and humanity in 
general. Woman's inability to reason necessarily limits her to certain 
social roles, roles which are within the functional social castes, roles 
which for her, are sex-specific. Such occupancy, argue feminists, 
socialize women and men differently, re-enforcing sex-roles and 
oppressive social orders (Grimshaw, 1986; Tong, 1989). In addition, 
such assignment by human type creates the kind of world where only 
certain human potentialities will be expressed, ignoring other human 
talents unseen or inhibited. For Dewey, who valued uniqueness and 
individuality, such a conception was unacceptable. 
This idea of an inevitability of our 'natures,' coupled with the 
assertion that the ideals of human potentiality are masculine, has other 
implications. For the feminist scholar it suggests that social roles will 
be determined by capacities expressed in relation to capacities 
valued. Traits highly regarded will become the reference point for all 
human expressions. Those falling short of the mark will be valued 
less, or minimally, classified as adjunct. A conception of a fixed human 
nature where the masculine is the referential criterion is the same as 
saying that sex is the determinant factor in human nature. If the most 
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valued ways of being are masculine, self/mind as an isolated, self- 
sufficient, inorganic entity, then what are the possibilities for women? 
If reason is an inherent human trait but is either absent in 
women or if women are kept out of those roles in which reason is 
exercised, then women will always be less worthy. Given that reason 
is the most highly valued human trait and given that women perform 
roles outside the realm of reason, women can not possibly be highly 
regarded. Women are functional in this construction. We labor at 
those tasks necessary for human survival; we are not part of what is 
excellent or genuinely good. Our functional roles are devalued, so we, 
too, are less than the best, less than good. We are inferior to the 
superior rational man. We are mechanical and not intellectual. 
Such a conception of human nature was rejected by Dewey on 
similiar grounds. In Democracy and Education Dewey takes this 
conception to task specifically because it separates humanity into a 
"laboring" class and a "leisure" class, a distinction which segregated 
educational values as well. The leisure class received a cultural 
education while the laborers learned what was utilitarian. This 
distinction, he argued, is not the result of something absolute or 
intrinsic. Rather, it is a function of historical and social forces. Dewey 
attacked the notion that rationality was a natural and complete power 
in human beings primarily on the grounds that such a conception 
dismissed or disregarded "the influence of habit, instinct, and 
emotions, as operative factors in life" (Dewey, 1916, p. 299). In a 
discussion about moral philosophies which denied the social quality of 
reason, Dewey expresses his disagreement with the idea that logic or 
reason can be complete because it is natural when he writes that bare 
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logic [can’t] spin new subject matter out of itself' (1916, p. 299). In 
his view, reason is "just the ability to bring the subject matter of prior 
experience to bear to perceive the significance of the subject matter of 
a new experience" (p. 343). Reason is a potential, an ability, a capacity 
for Dewey. It is neither fixed nor complete. 
The division of people into such classes, argued Dewey, was part 
of the Aristotelian legacy which endowed only the few with the ability 
to reason, leaving the masses (in which he includes women, slaves and 
artisans) to be "the means for others". As "means" women, slaves and 
artisans are believed to have "enough intelligence to exercise a certain 
discretion in the execution of the tasks committed to them". For 
Dewey, the idea that some are born to just live and that others are 
bom to live worthily was unacceptable (Dewey, 1916, p. 252). 
Given his naturalistic convictions, Dewey also had to reject the 
idea that mind/self transcended the organic. This rejection and his 
belief that mind emerges when the body is involved in interdependent 
experiences, allows for the possibility that roles need not be 
determined by a preordained set of criteria, but rather, that they 
develop through experiences, relationships, and associations. He 
makes this clear in Human Nature and Conduct when he rejects the 
"emphasis on states of consciousness and an inner private life" 
because it negates and is "at the expense of acts [all of which] have 
public meaning and exact social relationships" (p.86). If this is the 
case, then mind develops through action and not from a contrived 
spiritual providence, an indication that women's roles in Dewey's 
scheme may not be limited by virtue of their sex. For if mind must 
emerge from action and not from predetermination, then anyone who 
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is experiencing, acting and engaging can develop mind and 
consequently, take part in chosen social roles. 
The availability of choice is a key element here. Will Dewey's 
women have free choice? Will they be genuinely autonomous? 
Freedom to choose among alternatives, associations and 
interactions is central to Dewey's entire philosophy. If individuals, in 
order to develop those attributes of individuality and sociality so 
important to Dewey, need the "full and free" interplay with multiple 
forms of association ( Dewey, 1916, p. 83), how can choice be 
arbitrarily limited? Dewey would consider such limitations "coercion" 
played out in economic, psychological and moral policies. He 
comments that the "very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle 
form of suppression" (Ratner, 1939, p. 401). Such suppression, it 
would follow, would not allow for the full development of the individual 
and the social unit. Arbitrary schemes of social action which suppress 
the range of individuals' associations seem contradictory to Deweyan 
goals. 
Since Dewey's rejection of the view of human nature as a given 
and constant is the result of his conviction that the value of individuals 
can not be assessed by "some prior principle" such as "family and birth 
or race and color or position of material wealth" or by "the position 
and rank a person occupies in the existing social scheme" (Ratner, 
1939, p. 402), we can assume that all social roles would be open to 
women. Though he neglects to include sex as a "prior principle," 
Dewey believed so strongly in the potential of each human being, and 
stated very clearly that oppressive social arrangements were the 
results of actions taken by the autocratic and authoritarian few who 
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believed that the intelligence necessary for choice was confined to a 
pre-ordained group, Dewey must include sex as a "prior principle," 
even if it goes unstated. If Dewey was true to his own philosophy, he 
could not ignore the reality of women's lives and experiences, and as a 
supporter of suffrage, there is evidence to suggest that he was 
certainly cognizant of at least one aspect of women's subordinate social 
position (Dewey, 1911). 
"The right to control the conduct of others" by "the preordained 
few" was for Dewey, a rejection of the true meaning of freedom and 
the right to equality (Ratner, 1939, p. 402), concepts which are 
inextricably tied to his conceptions of the individual and sociality. 
In Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in 
Politics, Economy and Society Carol Gould sets out to reconstruct the 
foundations of democracy arguing that liberty and social cooperation 
are compatible. As the basis for her argument to "extend" democracy, 
Gould rethinks the concepts of equality and freedom in a way almost 
indistinguishable from Dewey's conceptualizations of each. 
According to Gould, and in line with feminist thinking, the 
traditional liberal theory of freedom ignores the fact that realizing 
freedom requires the "enabling conditions of action," (Gould, 1988, 
p. 38) setting up free choice as an abstraction. It is this abstract 
quality of such an essentialist view of freedom which Gould suggests 
promotes economic, social, political and psychological domination in 
societies (1988, pp. 38-41). Freedom, suggests Gould, should be 
interpreted as "the activity of self-development" which demands "the 
availability of social and material conditions necessary for the 
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achievement of purposes or plans" (1988, p. 32-33), conditions which 
must include self-governance. 
Gould's view of freedom as self-development is a temporal 
process with a "biographical or historical dimension" (1988, p. 41). 
The capacity for freedom to be realized thus involves the ability to 
choose among alternatives throughout the course of a life's purposeful 
actions. There's intentionality in action, an end, an objective requiring 
means, and clearly, the suggestion that the process has a biography 
and a history indicates that Gould's individual is as unique and as 
molded by interaction as is Dewey's. 
Gould also stipulates that the process of self-development is 
earnestly engaged only when choice is available in practice and does 
not exist solely in the abstract. As process, it must be progressive and 
because it forms "new capacities" and elaborates and enriches existing 
ones (1988, p. 47), it demands a wide range of real choices. Choices 
in the abstract can not 'free' individuals to develop fully. 
But doesn't such self-development lead to the detached, 
autonomous and egotistic individualism that Gould sets out to 
reconstruct? It is Gould's contention that self-development proceeds 
through participation in group projects because cooperative activity 
becomes the means through which an individual can carry out aims. 
Social or shared purposes allow for self-development but notes Gould, 
is largely dependent on the group's members to recognize the 
individual's freedom. This "reciprocity in freedom" requires that 
members consciously support others' self-development. Such social 
relations she submits, will extend and enrich "the range of possible 
human actions, intentions, skills and practices" (1988, p. 50). 
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The need for cooperation and support of others for self¬ 
development is a fundamental part of the substance of Gould's "relation 
of reciprocity." This social relation, where 
each agent acts with respect to the other on the basis of shared 
understanding, and a free agreement, to the effect that the 
actions of one with respect to the other are equivalent to the 
actions of the other with respect to the first (Gould, 1988, p. 75), 
becomes the cornerstone for her views on equality and the extended 
democracy she envisions, both concepts undeniably Deweyan. 
Equality as Gould defines it, stems from a belief that distinctions 
among individuals can't be made with regard to their potential for self¬ 
development (1988, p.61). Equal rights means free choice for all at all 
levels of social and economic life. Access to choices in social and 
economic situations is what determines equality, a view suggesting 
that equality is not a value but rather, a right. As a right to social 
choice, then, equality can only be seen as a political and not 
metaphysical doctrine. 
This is precisely the concept of equality proposed by Dewey: 
All individuals are entitled to equality of treatment by law and its 
administration. Each one is effected equally in quality if not 
quantity by the institutions under which he lives and has an 
equal right to express his judgment, although the weight of his 
judgment may not be equal in amount when it enters into the 
pooled result to that of others. In short, each one is equally an 
individual and entitled to equal opportunity of his own 
capacities, be they large or small in range. Moreover, each has 
needs of his own, as significant to him as those of others are to 
them....[but] each individual has something to contribute. 
(Ratner, 1939, p. 403) 
Dewey continues by adding that "each individual shall have the 
chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of 
contributing" (p. 403), and in his Ethics of Democracy states that "in 
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every individual there lives an infinite and universal possibility; that of 
being king and priest" (p. 25). But what is peculiar to Dewey's concept 
of equality is not so much that it requires the freedom to choose 
among alternatives but that choice frees intelligence which is 
necessary to direct action. It follows then that if choices are limited, 
individuals will not be free to develop or that they will develop 
unequally. The implications for those whose choices are restricted 
seem obvious. 
In both a feminist and Deweyan scheme, sociality and 
individuality have common aims. This integration is supported in both 
cases by a reconceptualization of freedom and equality and both 
suggest that the natures of the group and of the individual are 
somehow synchronized. This synchronization is what can prove to be 
of educative value for feminist educational theorists. But what models 
are given for such a social unit, for such a group? What are their 
ideals? Both feminist and Deweyan concepts of group stress solidarity, 
connectedness, common will and the integrity of the individual, but 
what sets them apart is their parentage. 
Dewey's fraternity is part of the triumvirate "symbols of the 
highest ethical ideal" (1888, p. 23); liberty and equality are the other 
thirds. His concept of fraternity, rich in the ideals of the French 
Enlightenment and Jeffersonian democracy, contained the ideals of 
group association for a common purpose, interest or pleasure. But 
unlike the tradition of fraternity that synthesized Kantian liberalism 
and the 18th century notion of social contract, individuals in Dewey's 
fraternal unions would not hold inalienable rights. As previously 
55 
discussed, such a group would not be entitled to suppress individuals 
or other groups. 
Would a sororial conceptualization of group have similar 
attributes? Certainly there is an element of common interests and 
purposes in sorority and ideals parallel to those of a Deweyan 
community. A "community of interests, shared beliefs, and goals 
around which to unite," "appreciation for diversity" (hooks, 1991, 
p.40) and shared pleasures are all aspects of the group dynamic 
feminists call "sisterhood." But what makes one uneasy about both of 
these is, as previously stated, their parentage, their sex-specific 
connotation, and in the case of sorority, the possibility that its model 
was fraternity. 
2.4 Choosing Models of Sociality 
What model for the social group can better equip Gould's and 
Dewey's individual for a life of full and free self-development? What 
model can provide such an individual with educative relations? The 
family? Friendship? 
I choose these two models, friendship and family, because each 
in its own way requires associational and interactional relationships, 
consequently inviting our consideration. But choosing family and 
friendship as models is deliberate in yet another way. It is a choice 
decided by what I perceive to be Deweyan sociality's educative value. 
Deweyan sociality enables individuals to be engaged in a life of full and 
free self-development, a course which is educative in the Deweyan 
sense. It is educative because the experiences promote growth in 
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general, and create conditions for further personal growth (Dewey, 
1938, p. 36). This criterion directs my selection of models. 
Given this, the models to be considered within Deweyan and 
feminist frameworks must provide the means for positive individual 
growth. Immediately I note that the family as model becomes 
problematic within our feminist frameworks. As Adrienne Rich 
writes, the individual heterosexual family unit is "at the core of 
patriarchy" and perpetuates many mysogynies. The division of labor by 
gender, the emotional, physical and material possessiveness of 
husband over wife, the economic dependency of women on men, the 
subordination of wife to husband and the "imprinting and continuation 
of heterosexual roles" are all part of this experience (Rich, 1976, 
p. 61). Can genuine self-development be gained through such an 
arrangement? Is there, within such a family unit, the possibility of 
opportunities for the full and free interactions necessary for personal 
growth? Is the supremacy of the husband over wife and child, for 
example, a relationship whose interactions will be growth producing? 
educative or miseducative? Feminist viewpoints are certainly those 
which assert that the traditional heterosexual family unit abounds in 
the problematic and miseducative. 
The typical models for social grouping outside the feminist 
tradition consider family, nation and neighborhood as appropriate 
paradigms and when feminists adopt or adapt any of these, criticism is 
sharp. Lorraine Code and Iris Marion Young both dismiss Sara 
Ruddick's maternal thinking as a model for sociality and both agree 
that positioning the family as exemplary of positive sociality a la 
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Elshtain fails to realize the socio-cultural and economic implications 
of such a theory (Code, 1991; Young, 1990). 
Our particular discussion of feminist sociality models will not 
include the example of family precisely because of what I perceive to 
be the weight of these implications. I agree with bell hooks when she 
says that "feminist effort insists on the eradication of exploitation and 
oppression in the family context and in all other intimate 
relationships" (1989, p.22). The fact that domination and oppression 
exist in family relationships is, thus, fundamentally problematic. 
Though certain aspects of family life, such as the ethics of care, are 
not in contradiction to feminist ethos, they are part of a socio-cultural 
ethic that is the impetus for feminist revolution. Again, it is bell hooks 
who notes: 
Thinking speculatively about early human social 
arrangement, about women and men struggling to survive in 
small communities, it is likely that the parent-child relationship 
with its very real imposed survival structure of dependency, of 
strong and weak, of powerful and powerless, was a site for the 
construction of a paradigm of domination. (1989, p. 20) 
The roots of patriarchal domination and oppression run too deep in 
the construction of the family. The family, I submit, in all of its 
multiple forms, has too many skeletons in its patriarchal closet to be 
of worthwhile use in our investigation. 
Is friendship, then, a model better suited for our feminist 
frameworks? 
Janice Raymond writes in A Passion for Friends: Toward a 
Philosophy of Female Affection, her book on female friendship, that 
female friendship is the "foundation for and consequence of feminism" 
(1986, p.13) and "part of the history of feminist discernment" (p. 20). 
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Inspired and motivated by women’s search for meaning, female 
friendship seems to be a means through which women have attained 
an understanding of their circumstances and their possibilities. A 
model of female friendship, then, is less problematic for our feminist 
consideration. 
But what does Dewey have to say about friendship? Can our 
consideration include friendship in a Deweyan framework? 
Dewey wrote enough about the family to validate our choice of 
family as model but he wrote almost nothing about friendship. He 
writes about "amiability" as a moral trait having an obvious connection 
with social relationships (Dewey, 1916, p. 357), and uses friendship as 
a thematic component when discussing the ideal and the real (Dewey, 
1957, p. 118). What we are able to glean from Dewey's rare and 
cursory mention of friendship is that individuals engaged in a 
friendship have a mutual understanding of each other and require the 
means for effective communication. Distance, notes Dewey, is "an 
obstacle, a source of trouble for friends" because it separates them, 
preventing intercourse and making contact and mutual understanding 
difficult (Dewey, 1957, p. 119). 
The choice of models, it appears, seems different for each 
framework. What seems appropriate for feminism isn't for Dewey and 
visa versa. Can this consideration examine sociality in a Deweyan 
framework using the model of family and then engage in an 
examination of feminist sociality through a different model? I submit 
that this is a valid condition for practical reasons--Dewey wrote little 
about friendship and feminisms find the family too problematic—but 
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more importantly, because our requirement that educative relations be 
possible can be met in each case. 
2.5 Family as a Model of Sociality 
"Society," asserted Dewey, is "one word, but many things" 
existing in many forms, not all of which are desirable (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 81). Those societies or groups, in which the members are aware of 
connections between each other and are free to use the knowledge 
gained from these connections to direct purposeful behavior, are 
valuable. They are worthy and useful because the consequences of 
such associated behavior will yield positive change, change in the form 
of individual and collective growth. Such consequences are not 
products of simply physical or "organic" association. Instead, they are 
the results of effective communication between members (Dewey, 
1929, pp. 166-167). 
"Of all of our affairs," notes Dewey, "communication is the most 
wonderful" (1925, p. 166). It is the sharing of meanings between 
members which leads to commonly understood meanings which, in 
turn, leads to what Dewey suggests is "metaphorically" a "general will 
and social consciousness" (1927, p. 153). Joint activity and 
association, whether physically immediate or distant, or whether 
temporally dissimilar, necessitates communication in order for the 
group or community to reach desired ends. Change is possible only 
through communication. Any action or event is "subject to 
reconsideration and revision" (Dewey, 1929, p. 166) as a result of 
participation in the exchange of meanings between individuals within 
the group. 
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Sharing and communication are critical for the Deweyan 
construction of sociality because it is through these that the 
consequences of action can be understood, and consequently, lead to 
future intelligent action. For Dewey, understanding how our actions 
and the consequences of our associations affect others is vital for 
sociality. We affect those with whom we are in immediate association 
and we affect those outside of that face-to-face. Political boundaries, 
he notes, are the result of a group's or individual's inability to 
recognize and understand that the consequences of their associations 
have implications for others elsewhere. It is erroneous to believe that 
the consequences of association are confined or that they don't 
"expand beyond those directly engaged in producing them" ( Dewey, 
1927, p. 27). Association, it appears, is not a private matter in the 
Deweyan framework. 
Dewey made it clear that social cohesiveness could only be 
brought about through communication. For Dewey, there was an 
important relationship between intelligence, community and 
communication. Intelligence is the method through which we can 
achieve community but it requires the sharing of thoughts, needs, 
desires and concerns through language (Dewey, 1927). As he writes 
in the introductory pages of Democracy and Education: 
There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, 
community and communication. Men live in a community in 
virtue of the things which they have in common; and 
communication is the way in which they come to possess things 
in common. (1916, p. 4) 
Thus, being aware of connections between ourselves and others, 
and understanding how the consequences of actions affect others is a 
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necessary part of Dewey's conceptualization of sociality. All this 
suggests, of course, that Dewey's individual is engaged in associations 
which will require that he be aware of the direct and indirect effects 
of action, an awareness which is the result of communicating with 
others. Though we are "not born members of a community," writes 
Dewey, to learn to be human, is to learn to be social (1927, p. 154). 
The implication here is that Dewey's sociality requires that individuals 
responsibly establish an "interchange of thought and growing unity of 
sympathetic feeling" (Dewey, 1976, p. 10). But one can also wonder 
what this means for the integrity of the individual. Will Dewey's 
individual "lose" his self as a consequence? On the contrary, writes 
Dewey. Learning to be social, learning to be human is to "develop 
through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of 
being an individually distinct member of a community" (1927, p. 154). 
Individuality is both advanced and preserved by sociality. 
This is an important element in Dewey's conceptualization of 
sociality. Individuality, uniqueness, personality expressed is a 
necessary component for his construction of sociality. As "intensely 
distinctive beings" (Dewey, 1976, p. 22) we present ourselves through 
associations. In full and free interactions between individuals, learning 
results from the 'give-and-take' of shared communication, and we 
begin to understand difference and its meaning, sameness and its 
meaning. Since Dewey believes that it is through sharing in multiple 
associations that we effectively realize our individuality, group 
membership can not possibly erase individual distinctions nor blur 
defined profiles. Further, by underscoring individuality's temporal and 
62 
geographic characteristics, Dewey does not make individuals 
equivocal. 
Dewey's plan for education was founded on the notion that 
schooling should enable us to be competent members of our social 
group. Using the model of the "ideal home" (1976, p. 23) for a 
curricular guide, Dewey maintained that incorporating those aspects of 
family life through which members learn cooperation, respect and 
reciprocity, would make the school one with society and consequently, 
its pupils competent human beings. The ideal of family life he 
envisioned was characteristic of pre-industrial rural life, when the 
home was the center for all activities. Due to the realities of necessity, 
responsibility, obligation and all other aspects of communal life were 
consciously sustained, serving to instill in individuals the moral, 
emotional and intellectual attributes needed for community. Family 
members became cognizant of the advantages of combined and 
associated action and grew to understand the value of shared purposes. 
Just participating in the everyday chores and work of the family 
enables Dewey's individual to respect the ideas and rights of others 
(Dewey, 1976, pp. 23-24). 
Dewey makes it clear that this "ideal home" is simply that, an 
ideal, and that from this he takes what is useful. What is useful for his 
model for sociality is the idea that the "ideal home" is imbued with 
understanding and trust. "Well-ordered" family life is, according to 
Dewey, a cooperative activity in which all members take part and 
where there is mutual confidence. In such a family, "It is not the will 
or desire of any one person which establishes order but the moving 
spirit of the group" (Dewey, 1938, p. 54). This suggests that effective 
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social groups must have these characteristics and, given his vision for 
group, this seems reasonable. What the idea of the "ideal home" as 
model for sociality also suggests, however, is that sociality demands 
some sort of authority. After all, we can suspect that given its 
prototype, Dewey's "ideal home" has an authority hierarchy where 
parents rule the roost. Though Dewey doesn't characterize the "ideal 
home" as the traditional hetereosexual-two-parents-some-kids 
hierarchy, we can assume that he envisioned a home where someone 
older, more authoritative, took command of the group. "The parent" 
in the ideal home "is intelligent enough to recognize what is best for 
the child, and supply what is needed" (Dewey, 1976, p. 23), and "is 
not a manifestation of merely personal will; the parent or teacher 
exercises [authority! as the representative and agent of the interests of 
the group as a whole" (Dewey, 1938, p. 54). Clearly, then, the ideal 
home has an authority providing guidance and opportunity for growth, 
and contains a power structure in many respects. 
But this makes sense in Dewey’s concept of sociality. Authority, 
in Deweyan terms, guides and supports individual freedoms, 
consequently stabilizing the social unit (Ratner, 1939, pp. 343-344). 
Such authority is not rooted in oppression and disabling control but 
rather in the desire for harmony, change and continued growth within 
the group. Consequently, individual group members must see the 
authority figure not as a concentrated self-serving power but as a 
means of support for shared group ends. One suspects, however, that 
the authority—the parent—must have some pre-determined goals given 
that they are wise and experienced. Though Dewey allows such goal- 
setting because it has the good of the group in mind, one can't help 
64 
but wonder how the authority attained this privileged position and 
how they keep from abusing their positional power. Dewey asserts 
that it is intelligence which breeds good authority and prevents such 
abuse. He did acknowledge that in reality this occurs rarely, as 
evidenced by the multiple societal oppressions (Ratner, 1939, 
pp. 400-404) but fails to make note of the possibilities for abusive 
authority in real families. But again, he was working with an ideal, an 
ideal sculpted from a tradition that saw nothing wrong with a 
patriarchal scheme. 
2.6 Feminist Models of Community 
Feminist models for community vary across theorists. Marilyn 
Friedman and Iris Marion Young suggest that modem urban life can 
offer insights into human sociality and serve as a "normative ideal" for 
community life (Friedman, 1989; Young, 1990). Janice Raymond and 
Lorraine Code propose friendship as the prototype for social 
communion and in Raymond's view, female friendship as model sans 
pareil. 
Let's consider each idea-friendship and urban life—and examine 
how each reflects or clashes with Dewey's social ideal. 
Dewey would concur with Iris Marion Young's thesis that 
Western traditional philosophical ideals of community fail "to offer an 
appropriate alternative vision" for a democratic program. Young's 
rejection, much like Dewey's, focuses on the inability of traditional 
social ideals to acknowledge social differences across groups and to 
recognize the difference resulting from "temporal and spatial 
distancing." According to Young, group members in traditional models 
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are fused in such a way that exclusion of others unlike them is likely. 
She takes issue mainly with the idea that individuals will lose identity 
by virtue of their membership and further, that affirming difference is 
socially empowering (Young, 1990, pp. 226-227). 
Young states her proposition clearly. She proposes "an ideal of 
city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference" 
(1990, p. 227), affirmation without exclusion. Social differentiation 
without exclusion is the virtue of city life which Young finds most 
appealing primarily because though groups may overlap and 
intermingle they do not become homogeneous. City groups, she 
suggests, have "borders (which) are open and undecidable" (p. 239), 
the implication being that such groups allow not only for inclusion but 
for the expression of individuality. This denial of uniqueness in and 
across members of traditional ideals of society is what irritates Young 
the most. She agrees with Foucault that the application of the ideals of 
community of Western thought would lead to "a social transparency" 
(Foucault, 1980), where understanding of self and others is the same 
no matter the locus of perception. Such blurring of individuality 
"seeks to collapse the temporal difference inherent in language and 
experience into a totality that can be comprehended in one view", thus 
denying the existence of difference between and across members 
(Young, 1990, p. 231). 
The notion of transparency or in this case, "opaqueness" is taken 
up by Lorraine Code as well. Code considers the idea valid but makes 
the case that it is the result of theories which present the individual 
and the group in opposition. The isolation that results allows for only 
a "bare recognition of difference-in-isolation, which may be tolerated. 
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but requires neither understanding nor care" (Code, 1991, p. 80). Her 
indictment of the traditional ideals of community rests on their 
"autonomy obsession" (p. 73), a preoccupation which has created social 
marginalization, exclusion and oppression (p. 72). 
Perhaps Young's urban ideal contains much of the autonomy 
obsession as well. When Young presents difference as erotic, one 
wonders whether such derived pleasure could be mutual. She writes 
that spending a Sunday afternoon in strolling through Chinatown with 
all its exotic sights, sounds and smells is pleasurable because "one is 
drawn out of oneself to understand that there are other meanings, 
practices, and perspectives on the city, and that one could learn or 
experience something more different by interacting with them" 
(Young, 1990, p. 239). The pleasure seems one-sided and voyeuristic, 
however. Her affirmation of difference seems a bit self-serving. One 
learns from seeing difference in Young's city, but does one exchange 
the favor? Is Young's Sunday stroll through Chinatown self-indulgent 
tourism at its worst? Dewey would likely think so. Without 
reciprocity, without interdependence and interaction, an ideal of 
community maintains autonomy paramount, something antithetical to 
the Deweyan ideal. 
Young also wrestles with the idea that such ideals of community 
serve to objectify. In affirming others she argues, we objectify them. 
The objectification does not underscore and celebrate difference but 
serves to assimilate individuals. The regard of others is always 
objectifying to Young, an occurrence she insists is absent from her 
ideal city life. 
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Young begins her defense of the ideal urban life by appealing to 
its reality and inevitability. She is convinced that "urbanity is the 
horizon of the modem, not to mention postmodern, condition" 
(Young, 1990, p. 237) and, as such, the appeals to anti-urban ideals of 
community will be unrealizable. It would seem, then, she would 
dismiss Dewey's proposal to adopt the virtues of pre-industrial rural 
life into post-industrial America. 
Are Young's ideal city's virtues so different from Dewey’s 
democratic vision? 
On several points the two seem in congruence. Each populates 
the ideal community with members who have some commonalities, 
whether they be problems or interests, and each preserves the 
uniqueness of the individual. Understanding others is for both Young 
and Dewey not a denial of uniqueness but rather, a point of relation, of 
sharing and being understood sympathetically. Each values the 
individual's on-going development of self when they acknowledge and 
focus on the impact of time and experience on individual lives. Both 
Young and Dewey, because of their insistence on the temporal nature 
of the individual, imply that fully understanding others is impossible. 
But here is where the similarities end. 
Young's ideal city would be problematic for Dewey because 
despite the fact that groups have "some common problems and 
common interests" in this city, "they don't create a community of 
shared final ends, of mutual identification, and reciprocity" (Young, 
1990, p. 238), Dewey's conviction that the sharing of common 
purposes is central to community life certainly goes against this aspect 
of Young's vision. 
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But the variety of experiences and the "eroticism" of difference 
inherent in Young's urban ideal is somewhat sympathetic with Dewey's 
need for fuller and freer associations. There, "people witness and 
appreciate cultural expressions that they do not share and do not fully 
understand" (Young, 1990, p. 241), but individual differences remain 
unassimilated. Young's urban ideal is much the stewpot but not quite 
the idyllic melting pot Dewey would prefer. 
Unlike Young's idealization of city life, Lorraine Code's vision of 
friendship as model for sociality embodies a "balance between 
separateness and appropriate interdependence" (Code, 1991, p.95) 
and relational reciprocity. Codes goes about achieving such a balance 
by reconstructing Aristotle's view of friendship so that it can be "less 
culture-bound, less androcentric and misogynist" (p. 98), a criticism 
she levels at theories which ideal maternal thinking and the attributes 
of family. 
What Code salvages from Aristotle's notion of friendship would 
please John Dewey very much. First and foremost, though not unique 
to our species, friendship is a human capacity. Our need to be 
involved in association with others, to be social, becomes the 
foundation for our ability to form bonds of friendship. Friendship 
demands intelligence, or in Aristotelian language, the capacity for 
reason. Friendship involves thinking not only because of the cognition 
involved in choosing friends but because friendships bring to 
individuals involved and varied claims: 
The life of a person enmeshed in these affectionate and dutiful 
demands will be more complex and ambiguous than the life of a 
rule utilitarian, who can follow a single moral line. (Code, 1991, 
pp. 103-104) 
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The cognitive value of friendship is clear: a relationship of 
reciprocity, it enables each individual to grow from the association. 
Even its continuation requires knowledge. Friends are participating in 
a relational process that demands continued mutual understanding. By 
continuing to know each other, friends present each other with the 
opportunities for growth, chances to experience and understand new 
ideas, and to engage in new associations. This vision of friendship 
provides us with the conditions necessary for the fuller and freer 
interactions that Dewey so strongly demands. In this light, friendship 
keeps the individual unique while still integrating the individual with 
others. Dewey would look favorably on such a vision. 
All of these models for socialities construct some vision of what 
and how our lives should be. They are "visions" because they are 
"ideals." Each has been fashioned as a mold for sociality, whether 
derived from an ancient ideal or reconstructed from an ideal. But 
there is an inherent tension in vision, a tension that reflects our need 
for the tangible. 
Janice Raymond asserts that this tension is not a contradictory 
phenomenon, that it is not the dualistic demand for either practice or 
theory, abstract or concrete, ideal or real. Rather, she believes, vision 
is undivided; it is near-sightedness and far-sightedness. It is the 
ability to live in the world as it is and imagining how it could be. The 
"essential tension" in feminism, notes Raymond, is precisely that: 
seeking to understand how we live in a world constructed by and for 
men while creating a world as women imagine it could be (Raymond, 
1991, p. 342). It is fitting that our final model for sociality is one 
based on real experience, one in which practice informs thinking. 
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Throughout the previous pages the metaphors of fact and fiction, 
romance and verity, and now vision and reality, have served as a stage 
for our discussion of sociality and the individual. These scripted 
symbols have served as a platform for our discussion, a place where 
models have metaphorically "come to life." But our final model for 
sociality requires no such platform, no such drama, because it is an 
established, long-standing, confirmed, durable and habituated reality. 
Sisterhood and female friendship, a real and verifiable experience, 
original and exemplary, will serve here as player and not as 
constructed tale. 
"Chosen, negotiated, achieved, not simply given" connections 
between women (Martin, B., 1988, p. 96) have taken many forms 
throughout time and space. Informal quilting groups, settlement 
houses, women's clubs, and consciousness raising groups all exemplify 
sisterhood. Though the purposes and objectives of each group varied, 
it appears that the running thread throughout each of these groups, 
and many others where women gathered in the absence of men, was 
the desire to, and importance of, making connections with those with 
whom experiences and meanings were shared. Within these 
sororities, many of the constraints and obstacles to self-expression, 
learning, and female relatedness which existed in women s lives were 
erased. Women came together not just for individual self-renewal or 
affirmation. Often, women's clubs arose out of an idea of "female 
fellowship" which would "work to elevate the moral character of 
society" or, as in the case of the Woman's Christian Temperance 
Union, "organize virtuous womanhood so as to transform the masculine 
world, to have feminine traits counterbalance men's brutal and animal 
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qualities.” Their founder, Frances Willard, made it clear that the WCTU 
was not out to have women compete with men, but to reform them 
(Rothman, 1978, p. 64-67). 
Perhaps most importantly, many women's clubs, unions and 
organizations sought to provide the opportunities for women to form 
and maintain female friendships where a "sense of freedom" prevailed 
and where religious and political differences would not dissolve 
common interests. Cultivating a "spirit of unity" among members was 
central to these unions (Rothman, 1978, p. 64-66). The General 
Federation of Women's Clubs founded in 1892 and Sorosis, in 1868, 
served all of these purposes but their existence alone was evidence of 
the value of female friendship in a reality hostile to such bonds. 
What distinguishes female friendship bonds from those of 
brotherhood? from those between women and men? What is it about 
female friendship that makes it such a good example of effective 
sociality in practice? 
These questions suggest the possibility that the answers may lie 
within the philosophical confines of essentialism or determinism, a 
possibility which has implications for our thesis. If we proceed from 
the position that the bonds of female friendship are consequences of 
an essential female nature, we will be unable to defend female 
friendship as an effective model for human sociality on multiple 
grounds. An essentialist posture in this case would dismiss the 
possibility that female friendship attributes could (and should) be part 
of all human associations, regardless of the sex of the participants. 
This same posture would prevent us from maintaining the integrity of 
the individual and would, I submit, engender the human transparency 
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which Iris Marion Young fears. And if our point of philosophical 
departure demands an essential nature that is sex specific, then 
communion with the other sex can never be fulfilling, productive and 
purposeful. 
Lorraine Code’s criticism of such an essentialist position 
addresses these very concerns. She charges the essentialist theorist 
with denying the "pitfalls of female essentialism" which entrust 
women with stereotypically female traits, serving only to relegate and 
confine women to roles which perpetuate their inferior social status 
(Code, 1991, p. 54). Such confinement doesn't fit comfortably within 
a feminist framework such as ours. That women, all women, could 
have "an essence, an inherent, natural, eternal nature" (p. 17) which 
was responsible for the vitality of their friendships, is a conviction we 
must disregard, if not solely on the basis of the evidence that points to 
the occurrence of difference among women, then on the possibility 
that essentialist dogma may invite oppression. 
What we are left with is the position that feminine attributes, 
and in this specific case, those attributes necessary for genuine 
friendship, are socio-cultural constructions. This is the philosophical 
disposition which will ground our discussion of female friendship as 
living model of sociality. A biologically determined posture would 
disqualify such friendship as model simply because men would 
necessarily be ineligible. Feminism must, in my view, be rooted in 
reality, and reality comes in two sexes. 
It is from a socio-cultural constructivist perspective that Janice 
Raymond develops her thesis on female friendship. In A Passion for 
Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection, Raymond states 
73 
simply that women don't have a "biological edge on the more humane 
qualities of human existence" (p. 21). For Raymond, it is the 
conditions and realities of women's lives which create the "social 
trust" called female friendship. The attraction of women for women is 
for Raymond "neither natural nor ontological" but the manifestation of 
a desire to recognize relatedness in patriarchal realities. The "hetero¬ 
reality" of women's lives, contends Raymond, places women in social, 
political and economic associations which are "ordained" by men and 
are only woman-to-man associations (pp. 5-8). Relatedness and 
freedom to choose relations are missing for women in such a scheme 
and thus the need for female friendship. Female friendship, then, 
emerges from "women's search for meaning" about herself and others 
like herself (p. 20). 
Female friendship's starting point is for Raymond the 
"companionship of Self," the experience of knowing oneself as a 
unique individual. It is a "Self which Raymond defines as an 
"authentic" self which women are "recreating." It is not a self which is 
"grafted" onto women by patriarchy (Raymond, 1987, p. 4). Given that 
Raymond believes in a socio-cultural construction of woman, we can 
take her use of the term "Self' not be be an essential self but rather, an 
identity which women construct individually and which isn't 
prescribed by patriarchal forces. For Raymond to say that the female 
Self is "authentic" and constantly being recreated by woman, she infers 
not that an essential self is present, but that a self constructed by and 
for woman is possible. 
It is the "affinity a woman has with her vital Self that enables 
her to care about others like herself (Raymond, 1987, p. 5-6). This 
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may hint at a kind of self-knowledge and appreciation that is self- 
serving and individualistic but I don't think that Raymond is 
suggesting this at all. On the contrary, the assertion is that through a 
real knowledge of Self, a meaningful knowledge, one is able to reason 
and consider the Self in relation to others. The real self, discovered 
through thinking, is uniquely fundamental and original, yet consonant 
with others, and not obsessively self-involved (1987, p. 222). Further, 
given Raymond's socio-cultural constructivist position, we can 
conclude that knowing the Self is not solely the province of women, 
further solidifying the case made for female friendship as the model of 
genuine sociality. 
To engage in positive relatedness or association, then, one must 
know oneself. But given the patriarchal realities women have 
experienced, how have women been able to accomplish this if at all? 
Certainly women have encountered socio-culturally constructed 
obstacles which prevent them from genuine Self-awareness. How have 
women scaled these barriers? Clearly, Raymond contends, women 
found others like them and engaged in a shared process of Self- 
discovery. 
Raymond's belief that women’s attraction for other women rests 
on this very point. It is a matter of Self-survival to engage in freely 
chosen association with those who share your concerns, affinities, etc. 
But this relationship is not one-directional. Raymond's female 
friendships are dialectical. There's an integration, a healthy dynamic 
between Self and Others, between individual and group. As a "social 
trust," these friendships involve "reciprocal assurances based on 
honor, loyalty and affection" (Raymond, 1987, p. 9), a trust which, I 
75 
assert, is extremely rare between women and men given our well- 
practiced patriarchal ethos. That female friendships have managed to 
get beyond socio-cultural barriers, or what Raymond calls the "female 
state of atrocity" (1991, p. 350), is testament to the strength of the 
human "longing for relatedness" (Noddings, 1984, p. 104) and self- 
affirmation. Somehow, women have known that given the realities of 
patriarchy, the coming together of women in the absence of men 
allows for the freeing and subsequent affirmation of Self. 
As "an understanding that is continually renewed [and) 
revitalized" (Raymond, 1987, p. 9), female friendship demands 
conditions conducive for individual and shared growth. Raymond puts 
forth four such necessary conditions: thoughtfulness, passion, 
worldliness and happiness. 
It is through thinking that a person can discover her real Self. It 
is thinking restored of thoughtfulness, however. Raymond views 
thinking as theory and thoughtfulness as theory applied, theory 
practiced. Searching for meaning is thinking; thoughtfulness, injects 
into thinking's rational orientation, a consideration and caring for 
others and respect for their needs. Knowledge without meaning is 
useless for association. It is simply "know-how" and lacks the 
thoughtful experience of knowing "why" something or someone is so 
(Raymond, 1987, p. 218). 
Because Raymond's female friendship begins with knowing the 
Self, thinking about oneself must be a fundamental necessity of female 
friendship, and such is the case. Raymond emphasizes what she calls 
the "duality of thinking... that is, the duality of myself with myself ...the 
one who asks and the one who answers" (1987, p. 222). In Raymond s 
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view, such meaningful thinking will enable conversation with Others 
because in understanding Self we understand our need for association. 
Each participant in friendship conducts the same personal dialogue, 
setting up the dialectical movement where being an "original Self’ 
and a friend simultaneously is possible. Thinking individuals, then, 
maintain their integrity while at the same time, attaining group 
membership through friendship. Intelligent (thoughtful) thinking 
communicated and shared will undoubtedly lead to intelligent action, a 
formula which Dewey would find made-to-order. 
A "thinking heart" is the manifestation of another condition, that 
of passion, for Raymond's female friendship. A "thoughtful passion," 
according to Raymond, does not place thinking and passion at polar 
ends. Instead, their integration and connection allow for the positive 
action that ensures the growth of both the individual and the 
friendship (Raymond, 1987, pp. 223-225). To influence, to act on, to 
move and impress and in turn, to be influenced by, acted upon, moved 
and impressed by others, is the thoughtful Gyn/affection of female 
friendships (1987, p. 8). For Raymond, friendship that is 
distinguished by "thoughtful passions ensures that a friend does not 
lose her Self in the heightened awareness of and attachment to 
another" (p. 225). 
Friendship provides a location in the public and private worlds 
of our realities and this, contends Raymond, is a critical significance 
for female friendship. Both a personal and political space, worldliness 
seems to be the practiced intelligent, passionate action of female 
friends. It is both personal and political and it must be given female 
friendship's relational thinking. Engaged in association, the Self 
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transcends the alleged boundaries between private and public and 
acknowledges both direct and indirect consequences of association. 
In a sense, Raymond's worldliness underscores Dewey’s contention 
that we do not exist as solitary beings whose involvements are 
inconsequential or unimportant. For women, Raymond's worldliness 
introduces her Self as female Self to man-made political space and her 
subsequent participation thus becomes meaningful. The worldly 
woman, then, lives with integrity in the world. 
But Raymond also adds that it is woman's worldliness which 
enables her to maintain the feminist vision necessary to change those 
aspects of the world’s realities which are unfriendly to her. This 
positions the individual, in this case, woman, as agent for change, 
agency which "acts with respect to the other on the basis of shared 
understanding" (Gould, 1988, p.75). Such agency, allows for the fuller 
development of the individual and, in turn, the social unit. 
Involvement in social action does not suppress the individual, allowing 
new capacities to develop and perhaps enact change. Dewey's 
individual by definition must be a participant, must experience, must 
be provided the opportunities for growth. "Worldliness" as it exists in 
Raymond's female friendships accomplishes all of this, though 
granted, does so only for women. So for Raymond's female friendship 
to be truly compatible with Deweyan sociality, it must be available to 
men. Though Raymond's model for sociality is sex-based, it does not 
mean that its values will be unavailable to men. Let's remember that 
Raymond believes that socialization has been largely responsible for, 
and influential in, building female friendships. 
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Striving for the integrity of Self is a process the goal of which is 
to ascertain and achieve the full use of one’s powers (Raymond, 1987, 
p. 238). Female friendships have historically given women the private 
and public contexts in which to realize this goal, a goal Raymond 
defines as "happiness." Most importantly and pertinent to our 
discussion of Dewey, female friendship "provides encouragement and 
environment for the full use of one's powers" (1987, p. 238). 
"To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity 
to do it is the key to happiness," writes Dewey in Democracy and 
Education (p. 308). For Dewey, "nothing is more tragic" than to know 
what one's purposes are and then to find that one has been "forced by 
circumstance into an uncongenial calling" (Dewey, 1916, p. 308). Are 
not Dewey and Raymond in harmony here? In order to attain 
happiness, Dewey's individual is engaged in "full and free" associations 
which promise self-realization and actualization. It would appear that 
the worldly environment provided women in female friendship does 
the same. 
2.7 Real World Problems and Our Models of Community 
The idea of worldliness also needs to address the realities of 
existing social difference. If friendship is characterized by a 
worldliness that positions individuals as agents for change, must 
friendship bonding transcend class? Must those engaged in female 
friendship believe in and accept "a re-distribution of wealth and 
resources" (hooks, 1991, p. 38)? In order "to influence, to act on, to 
move and impress," as those engaged in Raymond's female friendships 
do, and in order to share purposes, as Deweyan friends must. 
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individual economic realities, I suggest, must be considered. Can poor 
women engage fully and freely in Raymond's female friendship with 
the affluent? Can the affluent engage in a female friendship with the 
poor? It would seem that the answers to these questions resist the 
affirmative simply because inherent in the differences between 
economically determined classes is the conflict of interests. And 
herein lies perhaps the thorniest issue in our discussion of sociality. 
In each of our models for sociality, in Young's urban ideal, in 
Code's and Raymond's positions on friendship, there has been no real 
attention paid to the realities of economic class differences which 
exist today and have existed for much of human history. Young, for 
example, does little to address the fact that one of her "multiple group 
identifications" is economic class and would produce the "undesirable 
political consequences of oppression and exclusion" she disdains 
(Young, 1990, pp. 234-236). Such consequences it seems, would 
certainly lead to differentiation with exclusion. Though she does 
admit that in reality city life in present day times can be economically 
oppressive and calls for the re-organization of municipal resources, it 
is the institution of city she attempts to de-class, not its citizens. 
Young never makes clear how in the "unoppressive city," the citizen is 
also relieved of her economic oppression. 
As for Raymond's female friendships, the problem lies in the 
idea of trust. Raymond's female friendships are deeply rooted in a 
trust, "a social trust," which assures reciprocity based on honor and 
loyalty. But as Lorraine Code reminds us: 
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Trust involves making oneself vulnerable, granting other people 
access to, and even control over, valued aspects of one's life, 
confering on them the power as much to damage, destroy, or 
misuse those things as to take care with them. (1991, p. 185) 
The act of "making oneself vulnerable" to those who have economic 
power over us seems precarious and down right risky, and in turn, to 
"trust" those with less economic power seems in many ways, empty, 
meaningless and patronizing. There’s no real tangible personal or 
economic investment in "trusting" those whom one can or does 
oppress. After all, by even Raymond's definition, trust can not involve 
objectification nor can it be exploitive. 
Under capitalism, our American economic experience, the 
realities of class difference casts a shadow on each of our models for 
sociality. As a system which "depends on the exploitation of 
underclass groups for its survival" (hooks, 1984, p. 101), and which 
places material values over human values, it is unlikely that the 
economically self-sufficient would willingly give up material privilege. 
Further, capitalism's economically self-sufficient individuals are likely 
to be "reluctant, even unwilling" to acknowledge that any capitalist 
system, sexist or not, will exploit the lower economic classes (hooks, 
1984). The point is, that in any economic system where domination 
occurs, it is improbable that individuals will be fully free to engage in 
the shared purposes of friendship, purposes derived from establishing 
a "social trust." Domination, in any form, is void of Raymond's 
"thoughtfulness" and "passion" and further, doesn't allow those 
oppressed to "strive for the full use of [their] powers" (Raymond, 
1987, p. 238). 
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If the issue of class casts such a shadow on these feminist 
models for sociality, is Deweyan sociality also eclipsed by the same 
knotty point? 
Catherine MacKinnon begins Toward a Feminist Theory of State 
by claiming that "social power shapes the way we know" and, in turn, 
"the way we know shapes social power" (1989, p. IX). Since 
MacKinnon's "social power" is decided by social economic order, we 
can surmise that her postulate is an indictment of class. Such a 
charge seems a suitable point of departure for our discussion of 
Deweyan sociality and class. 
It is a suitable point of departure for many reasons. If, as 
MacKinnon implies, class membership determines our sphere of 
knowledge and experience, then the Deweyan model for sociality, 
grounded in experience based knowledge, must either allow for full 
and free interaction between classes through some uniform universal 
vehicle or be without such a restrictive social order. Let's first 
consider the latter condition. 
Is Dewey's democratic sociality free of class stratification? Is it a 
class-less society? 
In Democracy and Education Dewey suggests to the reader that a 
democracy in which "the free interchange of varying modes of life- 
experience is arrested," is a democracy in which there is a 
"separation into a privileged and a subject-class" (1916, p. 84). For 
Dewey, the implications here suggest that good democracy doesn't 
separate or prevent the free exchange between classes, and that 
classes are indeed a part of a good democratic framework. An 
expanding mental life, or the freeing of intelligence, let's remember. 
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is central to Deweyan sociality. A democratic society which limits 
inquiry and the "distribution of its conclusions" (Dewey, 1927, p. 166), 
through class stratification, has lost its true democratic spirit 
according to Dewey. Such class stratification, Dewey wrote, is fatal to 
democracy because it is the free interaction between classes that 
induces social change, a critical requirement for democracy 
(Dewey, 1916, pp. 81-99). A democratized society in Dewey's view 
would have different social classes but whose interchanges were full, 
free and cooperative (Home, 1978, p. 112). 
Dewey's vision of a sociality, where the boundaries of classes are 
permeable and changing, has a loose footing in the Platonic 
conceptualization of social order (Dewey, 1916, Chap. 7). Dewey 
concurred with the Platonic view that society is stable only when 
individuals use their aptitudes to perform functions of use to all and 
also agreed with the view that it is the role of education to discover 
individual aptitudes and to train individuals to put these to social use. 
But the Platonic model of a three class sociality seemed unrealistic and 
"superficial" to Dewey given the fact that original individual capacities 
were, in his view, "indefinitely numerous and variable" (Dewey, 1916, 
p. 90). Plato's three social classes suggested that only three types of 
individuals could exist and that an individual could only be educated 
for one specific class. In this way, Dewey recognized that the Platonic 
ideal, and all of its incarnations, are static and, thus, troublesome to 
him. 
Dewey believed that the "utilization of the specific and variable 
qualities of individuals" would allow for the change and betterment of 
society, a view which placed him at odds with the Platonic. Dewey 
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remarks of Plato's ideal that it had an end in view and no details 
alterable, no change hoped for. This was a deductive social plan, while 
Dewey, true to his definition of scientific methodology, envisioned the 
inductive, where "happy accident" was not the only hope for social 
improvement (Dewey, 1916, p. 91). What Dewey’s sociality demands is 
a constant state of moving, progressive change fueled by the realization 
of individuals' strengths and intelligences, a realization which would 
guarantee the full sharing of interests and interactions between 
groups. Such was not the case in Plato's ideal state. The isolation of 
groups in Plato's Republic made for "the rigid and formal 
institutionalizing of life" which effected the "static and selfish ideal" 
(Horne, 1978, p. 107) so antithetical to Deweyan sociality. 
There's no doubt that Dewey did not insist on a classless 
sociality, or for that matter, that all classes become one. It's clear 
from the construction of his democratic ideal that there are indeed 
divisions among individuals and groups. Dewey's emphasis on the 
requirement that each class have a community of interests and that all 
classes must have a reciprocity of interests clearly implies that 
Deweyan sociality will be class oriented in some way or another. But 
just how? How are classes constructed in the Deweyan social ideal? 
It appears that Dewey's social classes would develop from 
individuals' realizations of their strengths. Such a society, writes 
Dewey, must 
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make provision for participation in its good of all its members on 
equal terms and lit must] secure flexible readjustment of its 
institutions through interaction of the different forms of 
associated life...Such a society must have a type of education 
which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships 
and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes 
without introducing disorder. (1916, p. 99) 
Thus a truly democratic society must provide equal opportunities for 
mental growth for all of its members, must affect institutional change, 
and should promote controlled social reform. Participation on equal 
terms, changing institutions through inclusion, enlightened education 
for social modification? This all sounds too much like a feminist 
manifesto! Certainly Young's criteria for the urban ideal of sociality 
would be met—institutional change, participation and inclusion, and 
Code and Raymond would find little with which to quarrel here given 
their objectives for friendship. 
Given Dewey’s views on individual development and growth 
(Dewey, 1916; 1938), this enlightened education to which he makes 
reference in the above quotation, has a set of consequential features. 
Such an education must be free and universal and focus on individual 
self-development. Achieving self-development, some would suggest, 
requires control over personal activity (Bowles & Gintis, 1975, p.99). 
If the realization of a truly democratic sociality requires the full and 
free self-development of each individual and if the "essence" of that 
self-development is, as Bowles and Gintis suggest, "the acquisition of 
control over the personal activity" (1975, p. 99), then all forms of 
externally imposed autocratic control must be absent from Deweyan 
sociality. Controls dictated by the unequal distribution of power, for 
example, must be absent from such a scheme. Power imbalances 
resulting from a belief in racial or sexual inferiority must. 
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consequently, be nonexistent in Deweyan sociality, and even more to 
our original concern, so must the imbalance of power consequent of 
the unequal distribution of wealth. 
So if Deweyan social classes must be fully free to interact, and if 
each individual has the opportunity to develop and engage freely in 
associations purposely chosen, how then, is Deweyan sociality possible 
within capitalism? 
In a capitalistic sociality such as our American version, 
economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue that what one 
knows' is determined by class membership, which in turn, determines 
how one gets this knowledge and how far one is able to take it. The 
"corporate capitalism" system operating in the United States is, for 
Bowles and Gintis, incompatible with Deweyan ideals of social self¬ 
development on many different levels (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; 1975). 
First, Bowles and Gintis point out, achieving one's highest 
possible personal growth is impossible for all members of society 
because, in practice, American corporate capitalism does not provide 
everyone with the same opportunities for self-development. Classes 
within corporate capitalism remain stratified by their economic power 
(or lack of) and schooling reflects this stratification. What one knows' 
is determined by where one lives, and where one lives, is determined 
by one's capital. Despite free public education, Bowles and Gintis note 
that there has been little to indicate that there has been a "reduction 
of class stratification and income inequality (1975, p. 106). In effect, 
schooling in corporate capitalistic America reinforces class 
stratification (Bowles & Gintis, 1975; 1976). 
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Bowles and Gintis also claim that schools "by and large remain 
hostile to the individual's needs for self-development" (1975, 
p. 105-106), primarily because corporate capitalism has injected 
business values into the educational ethos. Competition, discipline, 
efficiency, control, domination and subservience, have all become a 
part of the American educational objective. Self-development as 
Dewey defines it, doesn't have a chance in a system where cooperation 
and mutual exchange aren't valued, where the "competitive either/or 
thinking" rooted in a self-serving individualism is reinforced (hooks, 
1984, p. 29), and where the quality of the classroom experience is 
judged not by individual growth, but by standardized norm referenced 
tests. 
Both of these criticisms of Deweyan sociality are valid only if we 
accept Bowles and Gintis' premise that the applied objectives of the 
Progressive educational movement and John Dewey's democratic 
educational goals are one and the same. Though Dewey certainly 
influenced much of the Progressive educational agenda, he was critical 
of several principles central to the movement and did not believe 
himself to be a Progressive (Dewey, 1938). 
The Progressive educational movement's insistence on the 
pupil's freedom to develop naturally troubled Dewey because it 
neglected to recognize the importance of the curriculum. Such an 
emphasis on the pupil at the expense of subject matter was far from 
what Dewey had envisioned. For Dewey, the point was not to choose 
the child over the curriculum but to bring the two together. In 
addition, Dewey insisted that neither the traditional education nor the 
Progressive or "new" education was adequate. What was needed in 
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Dewey’s view, was a theory of experience which did not "condition" 
students, nor did it leave them to their own devices (Dewey, 1938). 
Experience and Education specifically addresses Dewey's criticisms of 
both the Traditionalists in education and the then new Progressives. 
Bowles and Gintis' main criticism of the Progressive movement 
and John Dewey rests on their belief that "the failure of progressive 
educational reforms" is the result of the incompatibility or 
"contradictory nature of expanded reproduction, equality of 
opportunity, and self-development in a society whose economic life is 
governed by the institutions of corporate capitalism" (1975, p. 118). 
What Bowles and Gintis fail to realize, however, is that John Dewey's 
educational democracy and the realized Progressive agenda were not 
one and the same, and that, in reality, Dewey also saw the same 
contradictions. 
Dewey blamed the embracing of laissez-faire liberalism in the 
United States for the "intellectual justification of the status quo" 
(Dewey, 1937, p. 33). Laissez-faire capitalism was, in his view, socially 
enslaving because it allowed "economic relations to become 
dominantly controlling forces", preventing the majority from realizing 
their potentialities. The "effective liberty of thought and action" so 
important to Dewey, he judged impossible in such a state (1937, 
p. 34). In his view, the state, by definition, was a shared intelligence 
and a sharing of purposes. Government, as an organ of the state, did 
not "originate the moral claims of the individuals but should "protect 
all forms [and] promote all modes of human association in which the 
moral claims of the members of society are embodied and which serve 
as the means of voluntary self-realization" (1937, p. 25). Thus, the 
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state is responsible for establishing institutions under which 
individuals can effectively realize their potentialities. Government 
should be controlled by the social state and not visa versa. That 
American government could allow a laissez-faire attitude to prevail and 
dictate the affairs of the state must have seemed, for Dewey, an unruly 
tail wagging the dog. 
Dewey's proposal of a "constructive synthesis" for social action 
was based on his belief in the power and "logic of freed intelligence as 
a social force." Freed intelligence, in Dewey's view, would create an 
organized social plan where "industry and finance are socially 
directed" and which in turn, would provide "the material basis for the 
cultural liberation and growth of individuals" (Dewey, 1937, p. 55). It 
appears, then, that both maintaining the integrity and importance of 
the individual and establishing material security is a prerequisite for 
Dewey's social objectives. 
In the latter years of the American economic Depression, Dewey 
addressed these two points in several of his writings, two of which, 
"What I Believe, Revised" (1938) and "The Economic Basis of the New 
Society" (1937) are particularly relevant to the criticisms launched at 
Dewey by Bowles and Gintis. 
Dewey used "What I Believe, Revised" to stress that "individuals 
are the finally decisive factors of the nature and movement of 
associated life" and that when free to choose and decide among 
political institutions, will achieve the "genuine individuality" so socially 
liberatory. The dangers to the primacy of the individual, argued 
Dewey, are present in the extreme shifts of political emphases he 
described as "the decline of democracy, or the flourishing of laissez- 
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faire corporate capitalism, and the "rise of the totalitarian states." Each 
polarity, he argued, rendered the individual powerless, making true 
social good an impossibility. Though political opposites, "capitalistic 
collectivism in industry and finance" and "state" capitalism are "two 
sides of one and the same indivisible picture" (Dewey, 1938, p. 32). In 
both, Dewey's individual has little opportunity, if any, for genuine 
expression. True to form, the Deweyan remedy for these political ills 
suggests a balance between extremes in which the state, the collective 
arrangement of individuals, controls its institutions. 
Dewey's prescription begins with an admitted vagueness: 
The answer in general is that political activity can, first and 
foremost, engage in aggressive maintenance of the civil liberties 
of free speech, free publication, and assemblage. In the second 
place, government can do much to encourage and promote in a 
positive way the growth of a great variety of voluntary co¬ 
operative undertakings. (Dewey, 1938, p. 38) 
The details of his instruction involve: 
the abolition or drastic modification of a good many institutions 
that now have political support, since they stand in the way of 
effective voluntary association for social ends. (Dewey, 1938, 
p. 33) 
To Dewey, these institutions were: "tariffs and other monopoly 
furthering devices;" the system of land tenure with discounted 
taxation on behalf of private profit; the politically protected long-term 
capital investment which, in Dewey's view, directly taxed the 
"productive work of others;" and finally, government promotion of 
product scarcity, whether for private profit in the case of state 
capitalism, or for "public relief in a socialist state (Dewey, 1938, 
p. 33). 
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The way to strike this balance and rid the state of such 
institutions, is to make possible alliances of voluntarily cooperating 
individuals. Whether the result of state legislated dictate or through 
an empowered group's awareness, such alliances serve as examples of 
the effectiveness of associated and cooperative sociality. Socialized 
medicine, in Dewey's view, is a good example of a "socially useful, 
productive activity" which epitomizes the nature of the "functional 
socialism" he professed to value (Dewey, 1938, p. 34). 
A year after Dewey had made a sketch of his "functional 
socialism" in "What I Believe, Revised," he explained his thesis in 
greater detail. As a general reaction to the status of the individual in 
the world and a specific criticism of unemployment, Dewey's "The 
Economic Basis of the New Society" aimed more directly at what he 
viewed as the failures of American social order. What generates most 
of the failures, he suggested, is "the fact that we have had production 
and distribution organized on a non-social basis - a basis of pecuniary 
profit," a system which makes it impossible to address the public's 
needs, and which ignores human potential (Dewey, 1939, p. 420). In 
the same article, he argues for the implementation of the minimum 
wage, the building of affordable housing and universal health insurance. 
But more to the issue of the "modification" or "abolition" of anti social 
institutions, Dewey demands a profit sharing, cooperative management 
system in industry as an essential element for an "intelligent program 
of social reorganization:" 
[There is] the need of securing greater industrial autonomy, that 
is to say, greater ability on the part of the workers in any 
particular trade or occupation to control that industry, instead of 
working under conditions of external control where they have 
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no interest, no insight into what they are doing, and no social 
outlook upon the consequences and meaning of what they are 
doing. This means an increasing share given to the laborer, to 
the wage earner, in controlling the conditions of his own 
activity. (Dewey, 1939, p. 422) 
It appears, then, that Dewey's criticism of American 
economically determined social order has much in common with 
Bowles and Gintis'. Equality of opportunity and self-development are 
contradictory to what Bowles and Gintis call "expanded reproduction," 
a term, I suggest, is synonymous to Dewey's "collective capitalism." 
Both "expanded reproduction" and "collective capitalism" aspire to the 
same end, private profit and both achieve it through the same means, 
the economic oppression of the worker. Dewey certainly does 
maintain that material security must be a prerequisite for achieving 
self-development. "The failure of our social order" to ensure 
individuals "steady and useful employment," undermines morale, 
demoralizes, undermines self-confidence and self-respect and "the 
faith or belief in the world and in others" (Dewey, 1939, p. 417). But 
more to the point, Dewey's economic remedies for our social ills have 
never been appreciably employed. Further, Bowles and Gintis' 
suggestion that Progressive/Deweyan educational ethos failed to 
recognize the fact that without economic restructuring, their 
objectives would be unattainable, is erroneous not only in equating 
Dewey with Progressivism, but also in missing the fact that Dewey, too, 
felt that such an equation would put "the social cart before the social 
horse" (Dewey, 1939, p. 429). 
To dwell too long on the fact that many of Dewey's critics "failed" 
to recognize this or that in Dewey's philosophy serves our query only 
so much. Certainly, making note of, and examining the bases of 
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criticisms provides us the springboard for investigation. The 
investigation, in turn, becomes a process which enables us to see for 
ourselves, to judge for ourselves, to make note of our perspectives. We 
are thinking for ourselves when we investigate the roots of criticism, a 
practice undeniably liberating, an exercise which makes 
reconsideration and reclamation possible. That being so, what have 
we considered, what can feminist scholarship reclaim as a result of 
this investigation of Dewey's notions of individuality and sociality? 
As a reflection of the "tensions between individualism and the 
common good, between rights and sociality, between romantic visions 
and rationalistic orderings, between equality and difference" (Elshtain, 
1986, p. 56), feminisms confront constructed epistemic dichotomies 
unsympathetic to their purposes. The nature of the confrontation 
begins with the idea that reality is dualistically ordered, and 
ultimately, rests on the thorny implication that sex, the primary 
dualism, is the difference that matters. Reclaiming John Dewey s 
work must consequently involve the consideration of dualism, of how 
he addresses these tensions, or for that matter, consider if they even 
exist in his philosophy. And this is precisely what our investigation 
has attempted to do. 
The individual and the common good are not at odds in Deweyan 
thought. They are not polarizations, they are not opposites without a 
continuum in between. Though distinct entities, they constitute an 
integrated life. The interests of the individual and the interests of 
groups are reconcilable in Deweyan thought, a fact which serves to 
relieve this particular "tension" for feminists. 
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Even Dewey's notion of class serves to present feminism with a 
social alternative to a stratification based on inequality and difference. 
Dewey's "classes" are social constructions, not economic 
constructions. He stays true to his definition of "social." His "social 
classes" are only those associations of multiple individuals who share 
multiple interests and purposes. They are not classified by economic 
status, by race or sex. An individual, as a point in a circle of 
association, intersects with multiple and varied circles of association. 
As we, women and men, interact with each other, we are interacting 
with all those other points, all those other individuals on each circle of 
association. What interests we have in common, what purposes we 
share determine the intersection. 
Can we ever be completely excluded from any point of 
intersection? Dewey would argue that because there is no essential 
human nature other than our need to be social, we should all be able to 
intersect, to meet, to engage each other, even if only briefly or to a 
small degree, with every circle of association. It follows then, that 
women, in a Deweyan framework, can not be considered a class simply 
because we are not all uniformly the same, because we do not all share 
an essential nature. We may form social classes in the Deweyan sense 
because of shared purposes and aims, but not because we are women. 
If our examination has revealed anything, it has underscored the 
importance of the uniqueness of the individual and the absence of an 
essentialist posture in Deweyan thought. This, above all, serves to 
relieve dualistic tensions in many feminisms. Without the presence of 
dualistic thought rooted in essentialism, Deweyan thought becomes 
congenial and accessible to feminists, ultimately making each 
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conversive to the other. What it brings to those feminist movements 
with essentialist leanings is perhaps the possibility that despite 
women's and men's "essential" differences, fruitful interactions are 
possible. After all, if indeed a sexually essential nature does exist, is 
there any guarantee that each and every expression of our unique 
individualities will be shared by someone of the same sex? I doubt it. 
As a feminist who struggles with the tensions of categorizations 
within feminism, I find that John Dewey's notions of sociality and 
individuality provide me with useful considerations and possibilities. 
It's not really important that our investigation suggest that Dewey 
could gain membership in a particular brand of feminism. Yes, 
Dewey's construction of class aligns him with feminist theorists whose 
vision is of an egalitarian sociality. In ways, Dewey's dislike for 
corporate capitalism is in line with Marxist Feminist claims that 
capitalism is the root of all oppressions. Perhaps even Socialist 
Feminism, where both economic and gender factors are responsible 
for class oppression would find Dewey pleasant company. But what is 
especially valuable is that we have found in Dewey a past which can 
deepen and extend our understanding of our present, and most 
importantly, assist us in shaping a feminist future. 
To some, Dewey's belief in the ability of humans to find shared 
purposes and to acknowledge commonalities may seem solely a 
"romantic," an impractical and unrealistic vision. I suggest that 
through a feminist lens, it is optimism and hope which give shape to 
Dewey's romantic vision, not caprice. In optimism and hope there 
exists the possibility for change, and that possibility, is for this 
feminist, too important to ignore. 
CHAPTER 3 
SEEING, THE HAZARDS OF OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION 
3.1 Seeing 
'To believe that the world is only as you think it is, is stupid," he 
said. "The world is a mysterious place. Especially in the 
twilight." (Castaneda, 1972, p. 64) 
Carlos Castaneda learns through his apprenticeship with don 
Juan Matus, a Yaqui Indian sorcerer, that in order to really "see" the 
world, he must "stop" it, he must do more than "look" at it. It is 
through "seeing" the motionless world that Castaneda is able to "break 
the dogmatic certainty...that the validity of [his] perceptions, or reality 
of [his] world, is not to be questioned" (Castaneda, 1972, p. xiv). A 
feminist consideration does much the same thing. 
It is a similar journey in which I have engaged us. The questions 
we have asked of John Dewey's philosophy have given us the 
opportunity to "stop" and "see" through our feminist lenses, the pale, 
dim and shadowy "twilight" that Dewey had sketched so many years 
ago. The purpose of our journey, I've insisted, is not to decide 
feminism's place in Deweyan thought, but rather to consider Deweyan 
thought's place in feminism. We searched for the valuable in John 
Dewey's educational theory. We "stopped" his philosophy and then 
considered, or perhaps even re-considered, what we saw. 
What have we seen? 
We 'forgave' John Dewey's failure to place women at the center 
of his philosophical focus, but can we ignore the absence of gender in 
his philosophical and educational treatises? Did Dewey consider 
95 
96 
bodies to be gendered? If Dewey s ideal democratic education is 
grounded in the "necessary relation between the processes of actual 
experience and education" (Dewey, 1938, p. 20), what role do 
women’s and girls' experiences play in schooling and how does he 
assess their worth? 
In 1911, as part on an on-going series aimed at considering the 
issues which ”touch[ed] the interests of women and the family life," 
The Ladies’ Home Journal published John Dewey's article "Is Co- 
Education Injurious to Girls?" It is in this article that Dewey peels 
back the layers of his educational convictions to reveal his estimation 
of women, their capacities, potentialities, character and place in 
education. 
What Dewey reveals in The Ladies' Home Journal narrative, 
together with his ideas on the nature of humans, suggests that he 
believed that the differences between the sexes were the 
consequences of both biology and culture. For example, at the same 
time that he credits the idea of "weak and dependent femininity" as an 
ideal for girls and women to 18th century "sentimentalism," he talks 
about "natures" and "instincts" unique to the sex. Dewey equips girls 
with "feeling instincts" and "ultra-feminine weaknesses" which can be 
"worked out," "steadied, clarified and purged" through the proper 
environment (Dewey, 1911, pp. 22, 60-61). 
The "proper environment" Dewey advocates is the co¬ 
educational school. His portrait of boys' behavior suggests that boys 
also have traits peculiar to their sex. But what is important to note, 
however, is that Dewey seems to imply that though the influences of 
association positively affect both sexes, boys' "natural attraction to 
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girls makes them live-up to their best potentialities, while girls’ 
association with boys can lead them only to traits more "functional" 
and masculine (Dewey, 1911, p. 22). One of the inferences, then, is 
that though both sexes grow through the influences of association, the 
ideals of growth are masculine. Dewey also claims in this commentary 
that boys' associations with girls make them mannerly, courteous and 
civil, and that girls' associations with boys make them more 
productive. It appears then that since masculine traits are valued, and 
since 'production' is a masculine trait, then the successful citizens of 
Dewey's democracy must be engaged in 'production' oriented lives. 
What form 'production' assumes in Dewey's democracy is of 
consequence for feminists. 
Dewey stipulates that the co-educational environment provides 
the opportunities for attaining effective social ends. In Dewey's mind, 
"the significant tasks of society - remedial and constructive "will be 
carried out by both sexes. Thus a co-educational environment will 
supply the conditions necessary for both sexes to grow as individuals 
in a democracy. To become better individuals, co-operation between 
the sexes becomes a necessary enterprise, one which Dewey viewed as 
an "intellectual and moral necessity in a democracy." What is 
problematic for feminism in this conceptualization is Dewey's 
emphasis on the "importance of right family life for all social ends" 
(Dewey, 1911, pp. 60-61). 
Though Dewey acknowledges that "the part of women in 
industry outside the home" could possibly increase and that women 
could be given the right to vote, his insistence on the great value of 
the "right family life" and that "as wife the woman is in relation to a 
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man," makes one suspect that woman's role in his democracy is 
limited. Even as participants in higher education, Dewey entrusts 
women to the co-educational universities because they alone can give 
women the "scientific preparation for the responsibilities of 
parenthood and household management." Women’s colleges' curricula, 
he notes, only prepare women for the vocations (Dewey, 1911, p. 62). 
Dewey seemed to want women to be schooled in the same ways that 
men were schooled. In a letter Dewey writes to William Rainey Harper 
dated 16 January 1902, he makes the argument for coeducation at the 
University of Chicago by saying that the "proper basis of the relation of 
the sexes [is] the serious pursuit of truth in mutual competition and 
cooperation" (Gordon, 1990, p. 115). Dewey seems to suggest that 
women's exclusion from men's intellectual worlds devalued women in 
some way. 
It seems then that women, though certainly capable of entering 
the "vocations," must also play a specific role in order to complete the 
"right family life." Is Dewey relegating women to particular roles 
within the ideals of the "right family life?" Dewey may value family 
because he sees it as a social necessity, but he sees it as containing 
sex-specific roles. Is he suggesting that women enlist in what 
Adrienne Rich describes as "institutionalized motherhood" (Rich, 
1976)? Do all women have those "feminine instincts" necessary for 
the "right family life" to be guaranteed? Is Dewey suggesting that 
there is a "maternal" instinct in all women? Can women be both 
vocational and motherly? 
Inherent in all of these questions that surround Dewey s 
judgment of the "right family life," of "natures" and "instincts unique 
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to each sex is the hint of a biological determinism which is 
problematic for many feminists, as it should be for Dewey himself. If 
biology is the infrastructure of experience, then social roles must 
logically be sex-determined and specific. Consequently, it becomes 
important to understand what Dewey insinuates when he refers to 
"instincts," "natures" and "tendencies." 
In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey considers what he terms 
"The Psychology of Conduct." Within this chapter he unravels his 
theory of "impulses and instincts." As original, unlearned activity, 
instincts are merely interests whose meanings are acquired. 
Dependent on interaction with social media, an instinct or 
"phenomena" is expressed as a result of reactions to variable and 
multiple stimuli. "Native tendencies," Dewey notes, are complex, 
active "realities" and not singular or "separate psychic forces or 
impulses" (Dewey, 1939, p. 90). What Dewey is suggesting is that 
behaviors, responses to socialization, are not the results of a peculiar, 
biologically determined source. Instead, they are an "accumulation of 
stresses" which when effected "evoke reactions of favor and disfavor" 
(Dewey, 1939, p. 151). 
As "realities" which are the result of responses to multiple 
interactions with the environment, Dewey's instincts can be neither 
natural nor inevitable. He defends this contention by pointing out that 
because humans are biologically consistent, only socialization can be 
the cause of the "great diversity of institutions and moral codes." 
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When we recognize the diversity of native activities and the 
varied ways in which they are modified through interactions 
with one another in response to different conditions, we are able 
to understand moral phenomena otherwise baffling. (Dewey, 
1939, p. 156) 
But in order to negate the assumption that human beings are 
biologically predisposed to certain behaviors, Dewey must reveal the 
falsity of the assumption. He does this by stressing that the whole 
organism is involved in interaction and that reactions to associations 
are not a singular inborn feature. For example, when one is afraid, it is 
not that "fear," a singular, native tendency, is released but rather, that 
the whole organism is reacting to associations. No two reactions, no 
two fears are the same, Dewey adds. Fear of the dark is different from 
fear of the dentist, which is different from the fear of ghosts, and so 
on. But each is "qualitatively unique" because it is the result of "its 
total interactions or correlations with other acts with the environing 
medium, with consequences" (Dewey, 1939, p. 155). 
Given this view, would social roles in Dewey's democracy be sex- 
determined and sex-specific? It's true that Dewey's view of instinct 
would assure that social roles be determined by sex if the governing 
mode of socialization is sex-biased and/or sex-based, but could the 
case be otherwise in a Deweyan educational democracy? Will sex still 
be a difference that makes a difference? 
In discussing instincts Dewey uses "maternal love" as an example 
of conduct inappropriately believed to be a pre-determined, singular, 
psychic force. If we understand Dewey correctly, such a native 
tendency is the result of environmental consequences, not the result 
of a fixed nature. How and when and by whom "maternal love is 
exhibited, is the net effect of the organism in time. The whole of 
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"maternal love" is the compilation of reactions to interactions with 
ever-changing, ever-modifying environments. If women are those 
whose "maternal love" tendencies or interests are encouraged, 
fostered and rewarded, they will undoubtedly be the sex assigned the 
"mothering" role. Should Dewey's democracy sanction such 
socialization, sex will clearly determine social roles. 
But Dewey suggests that sex may indeed be the biological 
difference that makes no difference when he considers woman's 
sexual desire as "instinct." He dismisses the psychoanalytic view of 
women’s sexual desire on the grounds that it "transform[s] social 
results into psychic causes". 
Writers, usually male, hold forth a psychology of woman, as if it 
were dealing with a Platonic universal entity, although they 
habitually treat men as individuals, vaiying with structure and 
environment. They treat phenomena which are peculiarly 
symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time as if 
they were the necessary effects of fixed native impulses of 
human nature. (Dewey, 1939, p. 153) 
He goes on to discredit the anti-feminist notion of Libido as an 
"original psychic force," believing that social conditions, not biology, 
have determined such "libidinal" dispositions (Dewey, 1939, p. 154). 
Thus it appears that given sexism-free socialization, women in 
Dewey's democracy are eligible for all roles. But given the reality of a 
Western culture steeped in sexism, what roles can women play in a 
real-life Deweyan democracy? If feminism is to consider Deweyan 
education as a philosophical vehicle, this question becomes very 
critical. From his early 20th century comments in The Ladies' Home 
Journal, it would seem that those roles Dewey finds necessary for 
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democracy will limit women’s experiences. Does Dewey ever expand 
his notions of women's roles and experiences? 
In 1930, Dewey reinforces his philosophy based on "experience 
as the sole authority in knowledge and conduct" in his essay "What I 
Believe." In it, he stresses the importance of change in human 
existence, change which affects the many meanings and purposes of 
human existences, change which brings about individual growth. He 
writes: 
It is assumed, in spite of evident flux in the actual situation, that 
the institutions of marriage and family that developed in 
medieval Europe are the last and unchanging word. (Dewey, 
1950, p. 26) 
He goes on to add: 
it is clear that the codes which still nominally prevail are the 
result of one-sided and restricted conditions. Present ideas of 
love, marriage and the family are almost exclusively masculine 
constructions. Like all idealizations of human interests that 
express a dominantly one-sided experience, they are romantic 
in theory...The realities of the relationships of men, women, and 
children to one another have been merged in this fusion of 
sentimentalism and legalism. The growing freedom of women 
can hardly have any other outcome than the production of more 
realistic and more human morals. (Dewey, 1950, p. 29) 
Though he never explicitly addresses the value of women s 
experiences per se, Dewey comments on the uses of play and work in 
the curriculum in such a way that one gets the impression that 
women's traditional roles and experiences are not "arresting," but 
"liberalizing." 
Dewey's "active occupations" contain a "liberalizing quality" 
(Dewey, 1916, p. 199) making them educationally significant. Their 
significance lies in the fact that they are occupations which "tap 
instincts at a deep level" (p. 200) and which "typify social situations' 
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(p. 199). Gardening, cooking, sewing, weaving, painting, drawing, 
singing and dramatization are a few of the "active occupations" which, 
when employed in the curriculum, appeal to students and introduce 
qualities and skills transferable to other contexts. Growth through 
involvement in these occupations is inevitable. 
It appears, then, that Dewey valued many of the occupations' in 
which women have been traditionally engaged, but one can venture to 
say that their value to Dewey lies in their "productive" virtue and not in 
their association with women. Dewey finds significance in these 
"occupations" because they "typify social situations" and thus 
"[approximating] the ends which appeal in daily experience" (p. 198). 
Their purposes satisfy needs Dewey labels "human." 
Men's fundamental common concerns center about food, 
shelter, clothing, household furnishings, and the appliances 
connected with production, exchange, and consumption. 
Representing both the necessities of life and the adornments 
with which the necessities have been clothed, they tap instincts 
at a deep level; they are saturated with facts and principles 
having a social quality. (1916, p. 199-200) 
Though feminists would agree that the need for food, shelter 
and clothing are part of women's experiences, it's likely that the 
dispositions of the "instincts" Dewey's "occupations" tap are masculine. 
Instead of "production, exchange and consumption," why not 
"reproduction, sharing and cultivation"? The nurturing qualities 
necessary for child-rearing and teaching appear absent from these 
"occupations." Has Dewey ignored those occupations which are not 
"production" oriented? Has he ignored the reproductive processes 
Jane Roland Martin defines as conception, birth, child rearing. 
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tending the sick, caring for family needs, and running the household 
(Martin, 1985, p. 6)? It seems that such is the case. 
Though feminists would not classify the reproductive processes 
as "active occupations," its absence from Deweyan thought is both 
conspicuous and incriminating to a degree. When the reproductive 
processes of society are deleted, and the productive processes 
emphasized, women's experience is devalued. As Martin comments: 
Viewing education as preparation for carrying out societal roles, 
[philosophers] tie their proposals to some vision of the good 
society. (Martin, 1985, pp. 5-6) 
Dewey's "good society," practical and free of the ills of "private profit" 
(p. 201), appears to require an education solely emphasizing the 
practical, utilitarian human endeavors largely carried out by men. 
Even when he does comment specifically on the reproductive 
processes, Dewey's focus is on the sensible and the functional. 
Take, for example, the issue of birth control. In 1932, Dewey is 
one of several prominent figures asked to submit to The Nation 
commentary on the birth control movement. In his essay he calls for 
the removal of the "arbitrary restrictions" of the law and cultural 
sentimentality which forbid birth control education. Educating 
individuals on methods of birth control assures Dewey that the 
"intelligent control" of the reproductive processes will be exercised, 
resulting in a "supreme" quality of life. Families with "too many 
children and those badly spaced" can not provide for children the 
opportunities necessary for physical, moral and intellectual growth. 
Dewey's concern is not that birth control will grant women "intelligent 
control" over "blind natural processes." His uneasiness is with the 
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actuality that quantity is in this case, impractical. Is Dewey saying, in 
effect, that what is practical is what is valued? It appears that this is 
the case. 
What is a feminist educator's response to this? The first 
question that emerges relates to the idea of social efficiency. If the 
goal of our teaching is to shape social policy, and social policy is 
characterized by efficiency, what are the implications for subject 
matter? for entire curricula? for method? for the social roles our 
students occupy now and those for which they are schooled? 
If we hold social efficiency and utility as educational goals highly 
valued, are girls and women at risk of being schooled for those roles in 
which we can be truly functional? Will both men and women be 
educated for those roles to which they are particularly suited? What 
characteristic, what aspect of their personhood will determine their 
roles? And what does this mean in Deweyan terms? 
In an Artistotelian tradition this means that we would educate 
girls and women to enter those roles that best fit their natures 
because it is from their true natures that education follows: 
Both children and women must be educated with an eye to the 
constitution. (The Politics, Book I, Chapter XIII, p. 97) 
The "constitution" for Aristotle is first determined by sex, the primary 
distinction of nature. Dewey, on the other hand, believed that we 
discover a person's nature, a discovery whose aim is not the 
identification of some absolute, fixed and complete essence. On the 
contrary, human nature should be understood in terms of a 
progression and movement through time, a course that is always in 
relation to other people and things. Consequently, Dewey could not 
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suggest that we deduce our educational aims from the idea of a fixed 
universal human nature and could not take girls’ and women's natures 
as a given. He had to acknowledge socialization in the make-up of 
natures. In his article on co-education for example, he does so. Those 
traits traditionally considered part of the female nature, such as 
dependence and weakness, he attributes to the social context of the 
18th Century (Dewey, 1911; 1950). 
This seems to suggest that Dewey did not view sex as the 
primary distinction of human nature but there remains the thorny 
point of sex and social efficiency and utility. From what we read in "Is 
Co-education Injurious to Girls?" it appears that the best education for 
women is that which will enable us to assume "the responsibilities of 
parenthood and household management" (1911, p. 62), 
responsibilities which Dewey views as part of an efficient social 
scheme. Women will run their households with scientific efficiency, 
let's remember. But why can’t men do they same? If they, too, are 
schooled in the scientific method, could not the "house husband" be as 
efficient as the "house wife"? Probably not, because despite the fact 
that boys can learn to be mannerly, courteous and civil, traits which 
we can submit may be necessary in running a household, there 
remains the question of reproduction. 
Bearing and begetting children are necessary social roles but 
whose realities are a sticking point in this consideration of Deweyan 
thought. If Dewey wants what is best for the group, what is best for his 
ideal democracy, then men's and women's best potentialities must 
find an opportunity for expression. Does he consider the ability to 
bear children a potentiality? Does he neglect the obvious distinction 
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between men and women, the reality that one sex must be the child 
bearer? 
This consideration has not given us a clear answer to these 
questions perhaps because Dewey's writings are characteristically 
ambiguous. Morton White notes in Social Thought in America: The 
Revolt Against Formalism that Dewey waffles between rejecting 
formalism and being a social engineer. He writes: 
By refusing to formulate ends of social behavior for fear of being 
saddled with fixed ends, Dewey hardly encouraged systematic 
political engineering. (1952, p. 244) 
The failure to articulate specific means and ends in education and its 
repercussions is perhaps the most useful thing that feminist 
educational theorists can learn from Dewey and choose not to 
reappropriate, choose not to repeat. 
As feminist educational theorists, refusing or neglecting to 
"formulate ends of social behavior for fear of being saddled with fixed 
ends" (White, 1952, p. 244), we run the risk of enacting no lasting 
social change. Feminist educational theorists can't waffle for this very 
reason. We can be social critics, a position which Dewey chose for 
himself (Randall, 1939, p. 91), but we can not fail to articulate clearly 
our specific guidelines for social change. Unlike Dewey, we can not 
just trace the contours of curricula (Hofstadter, 1962, p. 375), we 
must list in detail curricular content and clearly define and describe 
our teaching methods. When we reappropriate Dewey's concepts of 
the individual and sociality and use them as the basis for our curricula 
and our methods, we teach women and men to consciously assess and 
understand their membership in society, an act which some of 
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Dewey's critics noted that humans just don't do (Flew, 1977, 
pp. 90-92). But this is something we want our sons and daughters to 
do. To get them to do so requires, that as feminist educators, we 
admit partisanship. It demands that we engage in the political act of 
feminist teaching and not just feminist educational theorizing. It 
demands that we become practicing social engineers. 
3.2 The Hazards of Outlook 
The world that the feminist educational theorist sees is a world 
that demands change and action. But what if we commit the same 
mistake that Castaneda initially makes on his journey? What if we 
don't "stop" Dewey's philosophy? What if we only "look" at it? 
If we only "look" and not "see," we could be blinded by the 
hazards of our outlooks. All outlooks, all ways of viewing the world, 
can exclude, whether knowingly or inadvertently, or unintentionally, 
dismiss the possibility of consideration. Our "ideologies," our 
"frameworks" can prevent us from considering some "mysteries," 
something long ago said, or thought or written about. Our lenses 
become rigid, constant and steadily focused, which fixes our 
perspective, which in turn, fixes us, the viewers, as well. Given its 
tradition of inclusion, it is unlikely that feminism would be too 
susceptible to these hazards, but it is precisely because feminism has 
an ethic of inclusion that it can ill afford to ignore these dangers. 
As a feminist educational theorist, I would now like to consider 
just a few of these hazards. 
First, there is the danger of dismissing or ignoring the valuable 
in other philosophical traditions. This particular investigation has 
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been an exercise in reappropriating the valuable from a tradition 
viewed outside, or at the very least, different from, feminist 
mainstream thought. We have sought to understand what, if anything, 
Deweyan thought could offer a feminist educational agenda and 
discovered that indeed, several Deweyan tenets could be 
reappropriated. Had we ignored Dewey, had we dismissed his theory 
as part of a tradition unsympathetic to feminist goals, we would have 
lost the opportunity to incorporate and expand Dewey's notions of 
sociality and the individual in our educational scheme, and 
consequently, been ideologically weaker. In Liberalism and Social 
Action Dewey warns that old habits and ways of thinking must be 
remade by the "new and disturbing." But here is a case where we look 
to the past to help guide, support and stimulate a "new and disturbing" 
force called feminism (1935, p. 49). 
Some may balk at the very idea that a radical position such as 
feminism could take away anything of value from Dewey, or from a past 
typically antipathetic to feminist aims. But let us see what this 
dismissal would mean. 
In essence, dismissing Dewey without investigation would be 
contradictory to feminism's belief in the value of experience. 
Converting past experience into useful knowledge for particular action 
is an integral part of feminist knowing. The use of autobiography and 
biography in feminist education, for example, epitomizes the value 
feminists place on past experience for present knowledge and future 
action. It is part of the feminist framework of knowing. Present and 
future action refers to past experience as a source of context for 
hypothesis testing. We look to experience to provide us with that 
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all-important personal context which enables us to devise and revise 
our theories and practices. Often, feminist scholarship transforms the 
past by discovering or re-discovering those voices silenced because of 
their sex or race or class. This is, itself, a reappropriation of 
experience that seeks to transform and modify the past because of a 
present day need. This is not to say, however, that we limit our vision. 
On the contrary, past experience, or traditional ideology, should be 
transcended in order to enact purposeful change. 
What I am also suggesting is that, in a way, for the feminist 
educational theorist to blindly dismiss Dewey because of his place in 
history is logically inconsistent. Valuing past experience means just 
that. The past, when reappropriated by the new, can provide us with 
relevant wisdom. We may decide that the value of past experience or 
thinking is that we find it contradictory to our needs. Very well then, 
but we have indeed referred to it in order to structure and direct our 
present and future actions. In effect, we have valued past experience. 
Let's consider one last case in point: bell hook's idea that radical 
feminist pedagogy is a political act and Dewey's belief in teachers and 
schools as agents for social change. 
In many ways, feminist agendas are revolutionary, and as such, 
they must go beyond prevailing thought. Successful revolutions, it 
seems to me, are those which eclipse reigning opinions and beliefs, 
and as a result, take hold. If they do not transcend the object of their 
displeasure, they remain movements, never really transforming 
ideology. 
Dewey defined education as a social process and the school as its 
principal agent for change. The school, in Dewey's view, should be 
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that institution which eliminates "the unworthy features of the existing 
environment from influence upon mental habitudes" and in so doing, 
transmits that which will "make for a better future society" (Dewey, 
1916, p. 20). It should be active in engineering social change and 
shaping social structures. Schools and teachers, in Dewey's view, must 
stay connected to the realties of the world; neither can be isolated so 
that students are not also isolated. Dewey charges teachers with the 
task of keeping students aware of the conditions, values and forces in a 
changing world. This, he says quite plainly, is the educator's "calling" 
(Ratner, 1939, pp. 695-696). Hence, teachers and educational 
institutions can't really be value neutral. A teacher's philosophy, then, 
will be practiced. 
Because there is no "spontaneous germination in the mental 
life," teaching, in Dewey's view, involves suggestion and guidance, 
sharing of experiences and participation in learning activities (Dewey, 
1929, p. 37). Teachers must leave behind the idea that subject-matter 
and that knowing are ready-made and outside of the student's 
experience. Instead, it is the responsibility of the teacher to know 
enough about her students and their needs in order to direct their 
inquiry. And the kind of guiding and directing that Dewey suggests is 
specifically purposeful. Dewey wants teachers to be those "leaders in 
social work" which give students the opportunity to engage in critical 
and investigative thinking, an activity which truly "frees the individual 
(Dewey, 1923, p. 517). His fear is that if teachers don't provide the 
guidance, the suggestion or direction, students will develop their 
knowledge and values from hearsay, innuendo or casual 
recommendation. He writes that if the student does not get the 
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suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something 
in the home or in the street" and goes on to purport that this 
suggestion is likely to lead to a superficial understanding of an event, a 
people, a phenomenon, etc (1929, p. 37). Dewey wants teachers to 
guide the process of "sympathetic and discriminating knowledge of 
what has been done in the past and how it has been done" (Dewey, 
1929, p. 40). Though he doesn't, and can't, deny the value of these out 
of school experiences, he clearly felt that only teachers could give 
students the opportunity to make intelligent sense of their worlds. 
Dewey's insistence on the social responsibility of teachers is 
rooted in his belief that it is "sympathetic and discriminating 
knowledge" which frees individuals socially, economically and 
intellectually. Sympathy, not empathy, for what was the way of life in 
the past, enables thinking individuals to move beyond the habits of 
past or present social orders, and partake in present and future 
multiple and varied associations. Individuals guided by teachers 
through inquiry, will learn to take intelligent action within multiple 
spheres of interactions (Dewey, 1916, p. 301). Teachers become the 
hand assisting the individual towards self-realization and in doing so, 
become the vehicles through which a social philosophy can been 
actualized and not remain theory. 
Characteristic of her candid, "no punches pulled" scholarship, 
bell hooks' treatise on radical feminist pedagogy is not abstract, and it 
is definite in its shape and form. It is a pedagogy which has 
"transformative power," a power which arms students with critical 
consciousness and enables them to resist and rebel against the 
oppressions of sexism and racism. Because students’ worlds are not 
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neutral, because students, as individuals, are attached to real worlds, 
they confront ideas which may not make personal sense. It is one of 
the goals of this radical feminist teaching to provide students with an 
arena for their "crisis of meaning." Students need a place where they 
can make critical sense of things. Their studies, then, must provide 
them with that "dialectical context" through which personal meanings 
can be attained (hooks, 1989, pp. 50-51). 
hooks' feminist teachers are, like Dewey's educators, engaged in 
social work. Theirs is "a true calling, a true vocation," a responsibility 
with political implications (hooks, 1989, p. 50). Their work is 
admittedly the union of a practice and a theory which seeks to change 
social ethos and order. The feminist classroom is one in which, 
according to hooks, teachers accompany their students through their 
process of critical thinking, keeping them "attached" to their worlds. 
As individuals, students in our feminist classrooms are not "abstract, 
isolated, independent, and unattached to the world" (hooks, 1989, 
p. 52). To deny this is to suppress their critical consciousness and 
ultimately, deny them their freedom. 
The radical feminist teacher must, in hooks' view, apply those 
pedagogical tools consistent with a feminist ethic. Feminist teachers 
must know individual student’s needs. Who feels at risk in the 
classroom? Who needs more, or less, of an opportunity for personal 
confession? hooks reasons that as feminist teachers, we can not 
transform consciousness if we do not know our students' intellectual 
or psychic conditions. We must talk to our students about our 
pedagogical strategies. Will I take attendance? How will I appraise 
your class participation? Teacher and student are mutually engaged in 
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this learning relationship, a relationship which seeks to empower 
both. 
Like Dewey's educational techniques, the feminist pedagogical 
tools hooks recommends have as their basis, the value of personal 
experience. In her teaching, hooks uses personal confession and 
autobiography to bring to the subject matter, students’ experiences. 
She does this for many reasons. When much of human experience is 
theorized, especially those of women and ethnic and racial minorities 
in the United States, confession and memory serve to validate 
students as individuals in a real world. It places students in multiple 
contexts and not in reference to, nor makes them solely the objects 
of, the dominant culture. Most importantly, given their feminist 
grounding, these techniques politicize personal experience. Students’ 
identities in context, are reinforced as real, appropriate, essential, 
significant and of great consequence. 
Can hooks' notion of pedagogical revolution eclipse Dewey's? As 
stated previously, it seems that successful revolutions eclipse reigning 
opinions and beliefs. Does hooks' radical feminist pedagogy have the 
necessary elements for success? 
What we see very easily is that hooks dramatically and purposely 
takes a political position, while Dewey leaves us without a specific 
political agenda, hooks' pedagogical position is clear, and though as a 
result of intense investigation we can submit that Dewey’s pedagogy 
had political implications, we can’t really say that he made explicit, 
any particular political objective. Dewey's desire for social change, if 
we recall, was not characteristically civic or political. We know that 
hooks' revolution is seeking feminist ends, but can we say that Dewey 
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had this or that specific political end in mind? hooks' pedagogical 
foundation is feminism, an explicitly political condition. Dewey’s 
pedagogical grounding, on the other hand, is his ethic of democracy, a 
virtue or conscience lacking a partisan conviction. 
The power to change the social world which Dewey confers on 
teachers is in a way, the result of Dewey's dismissal of external forces. 
Now, he doesn't and can't negate out-of-school experience and 
influences. But by saying that the external, out-of-school influences 
are alleviated and righted by teachers, he insinuates that life’s 
contextual realities are awkward, or at least problematic to the pursuit 
of real knowing and learning, hooks, on the other hand, realizes and 
acknowledges the power of the worlds external to our classrooms and 
takes a firmer, more radical, more definitive stance. Teachers, in 
hooks' mind, can influence, can guide, but they invite the outside 
realities into the classroom. It is only through this inclusion that 
hooks reasons teachers can match the strength of patriarchal worlds. 
It is almost as if hooks arms teachers more effectively, hooks knows 
that in order to have real "transformative power" in our worlds, 
teachers must resist, confront, rebel, and must do so blatantly. 
Dewey makes his teachers a bit too passive for any real effect to 
be felt. Yes, Dewey's pedagogical stance is subversive but it is not 
forceful, nor is it insistent, hooks' teachers, on the other hand, lead a 
public and unshrouded charge. 
So here we see after some consideration that though we can 
reappropriate some of Dewey's pedagogical theory, we must be aware 
that it can only take us so far towards our feminist educational aims. 
Had we reappropriated Dewey's "wait-and-see," gradual and passive 
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pedagogical posture, we would most likely find ourselves living the 
same fate as Dewey: never really taking hold, never really changing 
society. This fate. I'll submit, is not a feminist desired end. It was 
through "stopping" and "seeing" Dewey that we were able to consider 
what is valuable to our cause, and what we can do without. We did not 
dismiss the valuable solely because of the aspects we deemed 
worthless. 
But what if, in our efforts to be truly revolutionary, we harden 
our theory and practice, becoming rigid and unresponsive? 
The obvious matter is that the social world is in a state of flux, 
and... we go on teaching as if the Constitution and our forefathers 
had finally determined all important social and political 
questions (Ratner, 1939, p. 690) 
There is the need for change and flexibility in our educational 
theory and practice. For educators, the message is that a fixed 
pedagogical ethos freezes the status quo in time, and in doing so, 
preserves it beyond its usefulness. The absence of change and 
flexibility in pedagogy has a limiting effect and herein lies our second 
hazard. 
Maintaining a rigid pedagogical posture preserves tradition 
which can ultimately limit our students personally, intellectually, 
socially. Theory must be flexible if it is to respond to our changing 
needs and consciousness. Just as hooks advises the feminist educator 
to reassess pedagogical tools with each new group of students, so must 
the theory grounding her practice adjust. 
This is not to say, however, that as feminist educational theorists 
we should allow our pedagogy to be co-opted or lose its fundamental 
conscience. We should view ambiguity and doubt within our theory or 
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approaching our theory, as an opportunity for inquiry and growth. We 
should not stiffen our theory, outlook, or the scope of our vision, for 
fear of losing theoretical integrity. We lose nothing when we engage in 
critical consideration and inquiry. If we genuinely care about our 
theory and our practice, we will welcome those opportunities to 
explore and expand. If we engage in an open and free exchange of 
ideas, our pedagogy stands ready to move forward. A pedagogy 
resistant to change and dispositionally recalcitrant will surely fall prey 
to the dangers of rigidity. 
Especially for feminist pedagogy, the prospect of rigidity is 
problematic. If the primary value of feminist pedagogy is that it can 
empower us all, boys and girls, women and men, and if our educational 
aims are to better understand ourselves, our humanity and our 
experiences, then feminist educational theory and practice can not 
determine its boundaries. We should view feminist pedagogy as 
developmentally infinite. Whether as theorists we stay engaged in a 
conversation or critical inquiry with mainstream theories, or we 
consider new and yet uncharted theoretical terrain, we, because we 
are our theory, will stand ready for positive, progressive change. 
Armed with the tools of critical inquiry and consideration, ours will 
not be an ill-fated experiment. 
3.3 Conclusion 
He pointed to the dark valley in the distance. "If you don't feel 
that it is your time yet, don't keep your appointment," he went 
on. "Nothing is gained by forcing the issue. If you want to 
survive you must be crystal clear and deadly sure of yourself." 
(Castaneda, 1972, p. 268) 
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The end of Carlos Castaneda's journey turns out to be the 
beginning. From Don Juan he learns that he has to be "deadly sure of 
(him)self' before he can stop the world and learn to see. The lesson 
for us, I imagine, is the same. Are we, as feminist educational 
theorists, "deadly sure" that our theory and its foundation are secure 
enough to engage in critical dialogue and consideration with 
mainstream epistemology? We stand to be changed by this particular 
journey. Can we confidently begin this journey? Or will we discover, 
as Castaneda does, that it is not time yet, that we are not ready to keep 
our appointment? 
I'll answer these questions in this way: If feminism requires that 
we fully understand and identify the distortions of androcentric 
epistemologies, then we have no choice but to learn how to see that 
world more clearly. If feminism is itself a way of asking questions, 
then we must be ready to ask those questions of all ideologies by 
confidently taking part in journeys of critical consideration. If a focus 
of feminism is every person’s self-development, then as a living theory, 
it too, must grow and evolve. Unlike Castaneda, feminism can not 
decline the invitation to a journey to "see" the world. What we see will 
challenge feminism. But how else will we learn to ask significant 
questions and suggest new and far-reaching directions? We must 
begin somewhere. 
If we are to be truly revolutionary with our teaching, I believe 
that we must instill in our students and our colleagues, the value of 
shared purposes, the worth of interdependency. This feminist 
consideration of John Dewey's concepts of the individual and sociality 
suggests that we begin with a reappropriation of these concepts. I 
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submit, that by reappropriating Dewey’s concepts of the individual and 
sociality and using them as feminist pedagogical anchors, we can take 
possession of the cognitive powers of interdependence. Further, as 
we have seen through our consideration of models of sociality, it is 
through a feminist model of friendship that we can begin to achieve 
that interdependence. Engaged in such friendships is engagement in 
full and free interactions and in affective relations. Through these 
interactions, I believe, we become better able to broaden and heighten 
our intellectual abilities. In effect, friendship becomes both the means 
and aim of our feminist education. It is through friendship then, that 
we can engage in good feminist education. 
Mujeres, a no dejar que el peligro del viaje y la inmensidad del 
territorio nos asuste - a mirar hacia adelante y a abrir paso en el 
monte (Women, let's not the danger of the journey and the 
vastness of the territory scare us - let's look forward and open 
paths in these woods). (Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. v.) 
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